Sakharov Prize 2010: three finalists
Human rights − 18-10-2010 - 21:12
General
Israeli NGO Breaking the Silence, Cuban dissident Guillermo Fariñas and Ethiopian opposition leader Birtukan Mideksa are the three shortlisted finalists for the 2010 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. The winner will be announced on Thursday, 21 October, by the President of the European Parliament, following a decision of the Conference of political group leaders. The winner will receive €50,000 and will be invited to participate in the award ceremony on 15 December, in Strasbourg. The three finalists are presented below in alphabetical order.
Breaking the Silence is an Israeli NGO, established in 2004, by Israeli soldiers and veterans who collect and provide testimonies about their military service in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem during the second Intifada. The NGO is dedicated to exposing the Israeli public to the realities of the Israeli occupation, as seen through the eyes of Israeli soldiers, and to stirring debate about the impact of the prolonged occupation on the Palestinian population and on Israeli society. "If we vote for Breaking the Silence were are voting for peace, we are voting for the honour of Israeli democracy and we are saying we are in favour of two states: the Palestinian State and the Israeli State (...) Awarding the prize, we want to give peace a chance", declared Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Greens/EFA, FR).
Nominated by Rebecca Harms and Daniel Cohn-Bendit on behalf of the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) and by Lothar Bisky on behalf of the Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)
Guillermo Fariñas, aged 48, was nominated in the name of all those who fight in Cuba for freedom and human rights. He is a doctor of psychology, independent journalist and political dissident in Cuba. He has conducted 23 hunger strikes over the years "not in his own favour but in order to defend his compatriots" said José Ignacio Salafranca (EPP, ES). A supporter of non-violence who dares to denounce the Castro regime, "Guillermo Fariñas is a symbol in the struggle against the imprisonment of political opponents (). Because he is defending dignity and democracy in his country, he is the ideal candidate for the Sakharov Prize" say the MEPs who nominated him.
Nominated by Joseph Daul, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, Jaime Mayor Oreja, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Jarosław Leszek Wałęsa and Francisco José Millán Mon on the behalf of the Group of the European People's Party (EPP), by Edvard Kožušník for the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR), and by 91 other MEPs.
Birtukan MIDEKSA, an Ethiopian politician and former judge, is the leader of the opposition Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) party. On December 28 2008, Birtukan Mideska was re-arrested and imprisoned to serve a life sentence, after having spoken in Sweden with journalists about the way opposition leaders were released in her country. She was released from prison at the beginning of October, after almost two years' incarceration.
"The Saharov prize should be given to those who need international visibility and protection. Birtukan Mideksa needs both. By awarding the Saharov prize to Birtukan Mideksa, representing all Ethiopian political prisoners, the European Parliament would bring hope and would call attention to this young mother, one of the few female party leaders in Africa. It would also guarantee visibility of the struggle of thousands of forgotten political prisoners who fight for justice, the rule of law and democracy in Ethiopia", declared Adrian Severin (S&D, RO).
Nominated by Martin Schulz on behalf of the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D)
In the Chair: Eva JOLY (Greens/EFA, FR)
Monday, October 18, 2010
Sunday, October 17, 2010
Final Announcment: Let's go for Birtu! Let's Sign the Online Petition!
By Helen Niqusie, Germany
Under the fundamental rights of European citizens, Article 194 of the EC Treaty states that ‘any citizen of the European Union, or resident in a Member State, may, individually or in association with others, submit a petition to the European Parliament on a subject which comes within the European Union's fields of activity and which affects them directly.’
This right of petition to the European Parliament is a right one can exercise any time when s/he sees it fit. And it’s now time for us Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia to send out our petitions to Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to honor our heroine Birtukan Mideksa as the recipient of the prestigious Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. Please fill in this online petition made available by Freebirtukan.org and the Greeco-Gabonese Modelist and peace activist Gloria Mika and send it asap before Monday, October 18.
And here is the rest of it.
Under the fundamental rights of European citizens, Article 194 of the EC Treaty states that ‘any citizen of the European Union, or resident in a Member State, may, individually or in association with others, submit a petition to the European Parliament on a subject which comes within the European Union's fields of activity and which affects them directly.’
This right of petition to the European Parliament is a right one can exercise any time when s/he sees it fit. And it’s now time for us Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia to send out our petitions to Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to honor our heroine Birtukan Mideksa as the recipient of the prestigious Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. Please fill in this online petition made available by Freebirtukan.org and the Greeco-Gabonese Modelist and peace activist Gloria Mika and send it asap before Monday, October 18.
And here is the rest of it.
Wednesday, October 6, 2010
The arrest of Birtukan Mideksa was a criminal act in the first place
Press Release | October 6, 2010
Ethiopian civic, political and media groups as well as activists in the Diaspora held a meeting on Wednesday and issued the following statement on the release of Birtukan Mideksa.
After holding a sham election in May 2010, and forming a fake parliament and cabinet this week, Ethiopia's tyrant Meles Zenawi has released Birtukan Mideksa, chairperson of Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ), today.
It is well known that the regime re-arrested Birtukan Mideksa on December 29, 2008 on the filmsy charge that she was in violation of her terms of release by making a public statement that she did not ask for pardon in order to be released from prison in July 2007.
It is clear that the Meles regime had thrown Birtukan in jail illegally in preparation for the fake election that it planned for May 2010.
She has languished in jail from Nov. 2005 - July 2007, and again from December 2008 until this month under inhuman conditions. Both times her arrest was a criminal act and a violation of the regime's own constitution, proving once again that there is no rule of law in Ethiopia under the Meles’s regime.
As we prepare to commemorate the 5th anniversary of the massacre of pro-democracy protesters next month, we hold the Meles regime accountable for the illegal detention of Birtukan Mideksa and tens of thousands of other political prisoners in Ethiopia.
We also strongly urge the international community to:
- demand the immediate release of all political prisoners in Ethiopia;
- demand the opening of the political space;
- urge the regime to respect the rule of law and fully respect human and civil rights, including freedom of association, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press.
We will not rest until justice, freedom and democracy prevail in Ethiopia.
Contact: info@march4freedom.org
Phone: 202- 656 5117
Coalition of Ethiopian American and Ethiopian Political, Civic, and media organizations.
Birtu is Released!
By Eskinder Nega
Birtukan Mideksa, prominent Ethiopian political prisoner, was freed today from almost two years of absurd imprisonment---a blatant abuse of power by the EPRDF, specifically PM Meles Zenawi. She was accorded a hero’s welcome by family, relatives, friends and supporters. A press conference is due in few hours where her terms of release will be detailed.
Here is a synopsis of what had happened since mid- December 2008:
December 10 2008
The public face of the brutal Federal Police is startling. Clean shaven, tall, a little on the bulky side, urbane, and tastefully attired, he is in fact the opposite of the popular caricature of the uncouth and uneducated Federal Police officials. Werkeneh Gebeyehu , Commissioner of the Federal Police and its public face, though real power lie with his deputies, cut an impressive figure behind his desk as he spoke with Birtukan Mideksa on December 10 2008.
“What legal mandate does the Federal Police have in regard to this issue?” inquired Birtukan Mideksa, President of UDJ, an opposition party, after the Commissioner had winded down.
He smiled contemptuously before he answered. But her courage surprised him. This is probably the first time for him to personally experience it.
“This is no academic discourse,” he said, trying his best to deepen his voice. He was really caught off guard. This could hardly been discussed when he was instructed to speak with her by the battle-hardened leaders of the EPRDF. “I think its best if you avoid raising such kind of questions,” he said, almost unconsciously with who-cares-what-the- law-says tenor to his voice.
Werkenh recapped by insisting that the terms of Birtukan’s conditional pardon had been violated in Sweden; where, he alleged, she had publicly denied seeking pardon to get out of prison. He sought a public retraction. Birtukan parted with the Commissioner convinced that the EPRDF was out to frustrate her party’s prospects from the very outset.
December 23 2008
Almost two weeks later, Birtukan was again summoned by Werkeneh, this time courtesy of a warrant, which she demanded, to his lavish office in downtown Addis. It was to be a brief sojourn.
“You have three days to deliver a public retraction of your statement in Sweden to this office. If not, the government will assume that the pardon was secured under false pretense and revoke it,” he told her officiously. There was nothing more either side could say. An ultimatum had been delivered and a time-frame set. Upping the challenge, the demand was publicized on state media that night. The nation held its breath in suspense.
December 26 2008
Three days later, Birtukan responded publicly but ignored the demand to deliver it to Werkeneh’s office. In a brilliant piece she released to the press, she said:
"I have asked forgiveness through the elders by signing on the document dated June 18, 2006 in the spirit of reconciliation the elders championed and to bestow a political end to charges that were politically motivated. This is a fact that I cannot change even if I want to….To present a process that has complex features as a case that followed a normal legal process for asking forgiveness is either foolishness or ignorance….In my opinion, the real reasons behind all these illegal intimidation and warnings have nothing to do with transgressions of the law. The message is clear, and is not only for me but also for all those who are active in the peaceful struggle: A peaceful and law-abiding political struggle can be conducted only within the limits set by the ruling party, not the constitution."(End of quotation)
December 28 2008
What happened on December 28 is brilliantly here detailed by Professor Al Mariam, in a January 5 2010 commentary titled “In defense of Birtukan Mideksa:
That happened last week in Ethiopia. Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJP) President Ms. Bertukan Mideksa was strong-armed, manhandled and whisked away to the infamous Kality prison. In a VOA interview, Professor Mesfin Woldemariam, the aging human rights lion of Ethiopia, gave eyewitness testimony. On December 29, Prof. Mesfin was standing with Pastor Daniel and President Birtukan outside of Pastor Daniel’s office when four unmarked vehicles stormed on the scene. Approximately 10 unidentified armed men (thugs) exited the vehicles and violently grabbed President Birtukan and forcibly dragged her into their vehicle. Professor Mesfin attempted to reason with the abductors explaining that it was unnecessary to rough up President Birtukan as a simple summons would be enough to command her appearance in a court of law. At that point, the crew of thugs tongue-lashed Prof. Mesfin with a torrent of insults. One of the thugs assaulted the nearly 80-year old professor savagely with the butt of his rifle almost knocking him to the ground. Prof. Mesfin suffered blunt force trauma injury to his abdominal area in the unprovoked assault. He was rushed for medical assistance, and reports indicate that he is undergoing extensive tests to determine the extent of his injury. (It is to be remembered that Prof. Mesfin underwent major surgery in India a little over a year ago.) President Birtukan’s driver, Ato Abdurahman Ahmed, was also beaten mercilessly by the thugs.(End of quotation)
Post December 28 2008
Asked abourt Birtukan’s imprisonment, Meles Zenawi, was adamant that she will not be freed. “ It will undermine the process,” he said repeatedly. She had her one chance. Of course no one believed him; not even his steady admirers.
Of the last time he spoke about her in Ethiopia, I wrote:
Posing defiantly before probing journalists after a universally mocked “election victory” , Meles Zenawi,PM, whose party “won” 99.6% of parliamentary seats, spoke about her harshly, but noticeably absent the typical ardor: “This(her release) is a purely legal issue, and it is between her and the law. No one can come between the two. No one. Not opposition parties, not our friends abroad."
Much to the relief of the public,however, long attuned to reading between the lines of its official’s doublespeak, her release is not a “dead issue,” as has been land privatization for the entirety of his party’s existence. And by the dismal standards of the times, when the dominance of the EPRDF is overbearing, this is cause for optimism. There is room for her release short of a revolutionary overhaul.(End of quotation.)
September 22 2010
Meles responds to query about Birtukan's imprisonment at Columbia University. " I wouldn't be surprised if she were to ask for a pardon. And I wouldn't be surprised if the government was to grant it to her," he said.
Few days later, "mediators" leaked news of her imminent release. Family members also quietly confirm her pending release.
October 4 2010
Mediators inform journalists of a planned press conference on October 5 2010. The theme: Bitrtuka's release. It's now semi-official. Less than twenty four hours to go!
October 5 2010
Unnamed government officials confirm her release "There was no bargaining. This is purely a magnanimous act by the government," said one unnamed government official haughtily to local papers.An obvious attempt to dampen the celebratory mood. (Won't work, guys!!! She is a heroine in the eyes of millions! Give it up!!)
Birtukan is finally FREE! Accorded a hero's welcome.
Saturday, July 3, 2010
Jeffrey Gettleman: Reporting From Mogadishu
NPRJeffrey Gettleman calls Somalia the "most dangerous place in the world."
The East Africa bureau chief for the New York Times tells Fresh Air's Terry Gross that the country — where violent rebels fight for control and wreak havoc in villages nationwide — is just as hopeless as it was in 1991, when the central government collapsed.
"There's no green zone. There's no one part of Somalia that's safe," Gettleman says. "That's the problem. In some of these other countries like Iraq or Afghanistan, where I've worked, there are conflict areas, there are lawless areas, but there's one part of the country that is somewhat stable, where if you needed help, you could get it. In Somalia, that doesn't really exist."
Gettleman has made more than a dozen trips to Somalia. Last year, he described the country in Foreign Policy as "a breeding ground for warlords, pirates, kidnappers, bomb makers, fanatical Islamist insurgents, freelance gunmen and idle, angry youth with no education and way too many bullets."
Gettleman, who recently wrote about the conscription of child soldiers by Somalia's own transitional government for the Times, says that despite the safety risks, he plans to continue reporting on the violence in East Africa.
"In the part of the world where I work, there are fewer and fewer journalists that have the resources, that have the bigger media organizations that can back them up, that can spend the money, that can take these risks and that can report these stories," he says.
"One of the consequences of the child-soldiers story we did was the government was so outraged ... that they have threatened the local Somali journalists that helped us report that story. And in some cases, some of the people who worked with us had to flee the country. And that's just an example of how difficult it is in many of these countries to illuminate what's happening
Interview Highlights
On ideology in African internal conflicts "What we're seeing across Africa today is many internal conflicts that have an absence of ideology. They're more criminally driven wars. From the reading I've done and compared to the liberation wars of yesteryear — in Eritrea, in Zimbabwe, in Ethiopia, even in Angola — there were causes back then. And of course there was criminality and violence, and there was gratuitous bloodshed, but it seemed like these rebel movements actually stood for something. They had popular support. ... Today it's totally different. The rebel populations prey upon the people they're supposed to be liberating. If you look in Congo, there are dozens of so-called rebel groups, and they have absolutely no popular support. In Somalia, you have the Shabab rebel group fighting against the government and trying to overthrow the weak transitional government in Somalia, and these guys are widely reviled by the Somali population. They're trying to impose a harsh and alien form of Islam, and the people are chafing under their rule, and they have very little popular support."
On child soldiers
"As these movements gravitate further and further away from having an ideological root, from having a real cause, there's basically no adults that want to join them. There's no reason to join them. They're left with trying to steal or kidnap or conscript children to fight their wars because no reasonable adult is going to join."
On why some African militias mutilate people
"I think it's a function of very weak states, that when you have these very poor countries, these things emerge and they take on an energy of their own. For example, the [militia group] LRA started out in Uganda in the late '80s, when the state was very weak. It wasn't very long ago that Idi Amin had brutalized the whole country. There had been a lot of political turmoil. The current government was just beginning to get some traction. And there were large parts of the country that were still chaotic. And [the LRA] was able to use that as first an excuse to exist and to fight against the government but then as a way to spread and operate because the government wasn't strong enough."
On the current state of Somalia
"It's probably the modern world's longest-running example of a chaotic state with no central government. This is despite billions of dollars, enormous diplomatic attention, one peace effort after another, and 20 years later, the place is chaotic and violent and hopeless, in many ways as it was in 1991 when the government collapsed."
On the ideological changes that have taken place in Somalia
"They're fighting each other and they have these cross-clan lines, and you have this new sort of axis of conflict. But the problem is when you have these places that remain mired in the state of anarchy for that long, every day that's like that, it gets harder and harder to reimpose authority. In Somalia, people adapt. They get used to the fact that there's no central government. Businessmen start schools. Neighborhoods band together to provide their own generators. I even saw, during my first visits to Mogadishu, a privatized mailbox where you buy a stamp from a businessman, stick it on a letter and stick it in a mailbox and they deliver it for you. And then you have this young generation in Somalia. These kids who haven't been in school for their entire lives, if they're 25 years or younger, basically this is all they know. They don't know what a functioning government does. They don't know the need for it."
To EPRDF: Dissolve new parliament (It's legal!)
By Eskinder Nega
The preparation for the elections in May 2010 was more than a year in the making in the PM’s office. Abay Tsehaye, once a fixture in popular imagination as one of several mystic leaders who were really running the EPRDF behind the public persona of Meles Zenawi, but later to be demystified, publicly humiliated and now a grateful underling with a ministerial portfolio as national security advisor approached the PM’s office every morning with a judicious expression. Invariably, he was impeccably attired, and frequently held a thin folder in one of his hands. And for what time they deemed necessary, Abay had almost exclusive access (but not always) to the PM while he briefed him on a range of national security developments, but which, according to sources, often ended up being dominated by the approaching elections.
In the meantime, Meles had insisted on preparing thoroughly for mass unrest, particularly in Addis, with a contingency plan even for an emergency evacuation of the palace. Tens of thousands of security personnel were trained and deployed in and around Addis: the latest vehicles and firearms were purchased and intelligence (both human and electronics) was beefed up. All part of a concerted effort “if possible, to deter; if not, to contain and crush riots.” Indeed, each stage of the plan had gone faultlessly; gratifying habitually worrying Meles. And they were all to be rewarded when Election Day came and went peacefully.
But what neither Meles Zenawi nor his security apparatus prepared for, nor foresee, was a party machine that was to deliver more than it was meant to (the 99 .6% “victory”) – a Pyrrhic victory that has shattered the moral foundation of the system.
Meles Zenawi approached the election by the book. He set a strategy: win the election by any means necessary. He afforded an efficient management: look no further than the tens of thousands of security personnel deployed with clockwork precision. He articulated a unique political vision: revolutionary democracy, as he eccentrically calls it. And he tried to establish a personality cult: women and youth were encouraged to wear t-shirts bearing his image. (Everyone stopped wearing them after the first day.)
What failed spectacularly, while he was busy elsewhere, was the judgment of his party underlings. Their obtuse single-mindedness has pushed the system to the brink by giving it an electoral “victory” that could be believed by none. This illustrates the chronic lack of quality middle-rankers---the true believers--- that is precariously dogging the EPRDF. In the hysteria that followed the 2005 elections, millions of new recruits were literally conscripted in to the EPRDF with no regard to standard recruitment guidelines. Many of them have moved up the ladder to middle ranking positions owing to superior education over long time members. There was an implicit, though not quite formally articulated, understanding to their mass enlistment: they will serve and they expect to be rewarded in return. It’s strictly a utilitarian relationship. And that is what essentially prevailed in this election. They were asked to deliver(by whatever means necessary); they did, and they expect to be rewarded. Beyond that, it’s for the real politicians to pick up the pieces.
The EPRDF leadership slyly recognizes that the absence of overt protests by the public is not an acknowledgment of the new status quo; which has palpably slammed the door on peaceful dissent in all but name. Neither does it need to be reminded of King Menelik, who after proclaiming one of his edicts inquired about the public’s reaction only to be told by thrilled aides that there were none, reportedly said, ‘ Ah, this means they are against it,’ to dramatize the public’s dangerously suppressed anger. This anger will sooner or later seek an outlet; it will not remain bottled up forever. And the indefensible “result” of the election has also fortuitously reduced the EPRDF grassroots---who, unlike the party’s top brass, live amongst the people--- in to an emotional wreak. No one is winning from this election “result.” This is where the role of Meles Zenawi is imperative to thwart a looming disaster for his party and the nation. His domination of his party is no more simply intellectual. A bungled election has elevated it to an emotional level as well. The party grassroots look up to him to lead them out of moral wilderness. He should rise up to the call of leadership and foresight.
Here is a roadmap for the EPRDF out of the quandary: even with the specious legal wrangling over a re-run over, it’s still possible for the EPRDF to legally realize fresh elections within the coming six months. What is needed is only the political will—really the will of Meles Zenawi—to dissolve the new parliament in accordance with Article 60 of the Constitution.
Here is the Constitution in its own words:
Ethiopian Constitution: Article 60
Dissolution of the House
1. With the consent of the House, the Prime Minister may cause the dissolution of the House before the expiry of its term in order to hold new elections.
2. The President may invite political parties to form a coalition government within one week, if the Council of Ministers of a previous coalition is dissolved because of the loss of its majority in the House. The House shall be dissolved and new elections shall be held if the political parties cannot agree to the continuation of the previous coalition or to form a new majority coalition.
3. If the House is dissolved pursuant to sub-Article 1 or 2 of this Article, new elections shall be held within six months of its dissolution.
4. The new House shall convene within thirty days of the conclusion of the elections.
5. Following the dissolution of the House, the previous governing party of coalition of parties shall continue as a caretaker government. Beyond conducting the day to day affairs of government and organizing new elections, it may not enact new proclamations, regulations or decrees, nor may it repeal or amend any existing law.(End of Article.)
Sub Article 1 is evidently originally tailored for the enduring EPRDF strategy to hold onto power up to the last minute, and when on the verge of being overwhelmed negotiate within the confines of the Constitution. But whatever the Machiavellian intent of its framers may have been, it also gives both the PM and the EPRDF the legal framework to correct the present crisis brought about by the ridiculous margin of “victory”. They need to seize it and employ it to the advantage of the nation.
As is clearly stipulated in sub-Article 1, the PM can dissolve parliament by the consent of its majority for what ever reason he sees fit. And what better raison d'être than an election result discredited by even those who voted for the “winning” party. Only a simple majority is required for dissolution, not a two thirds super-majority. But even if the law had required a super majority, no doubt that EPRDF parliamentarians can be counted on to deliver every single vote required. Parliamentarians are expected to vote for the party line at all times. Unlike most democracies, conscience is belligerently discouraged from playing a role in how they vote. In fact, party teaching maintains that seats won under the banner the party belongs to the EPRDF; for it to use as it thinks best. A diversion is defined as a breach of contract between voter and parliamentarian. The penalty is a swift recall, as had once happened against Seye Abraha et al after their fallout with Meles Zenawi. Parliamentarians will challenge the ethos only at the certain peril of their political careers. Few will dare to tread on that path if the EPRDF leadership is to opt for a re-run. But in all likelihood, it is safe to assume that they are less than enthusiastic about joining a thoroughly discredited parliament and would welcome a fresh election that offer them some chance of being elected legitimately.
Once a vote of dissolution is carried out successfully, what will remain is fresh elections in accordance with sub-Article 3 within six months. Such an opening for the nation and the EPRDF, entirely within the legal and constitutional framework, something the EPRDF is adamant about, is what Meles should be encouraged to do by his true friends--- his true local and international friends.
The preparation for the elections in May 2010 was more than a year in the making in the PM’s office. Abay Tsehaye, once a fixture in popular imagination as one of several mystic leaders who were really running the EPRDF behind the public persona of Meles Zenawi, but later to be demystified, publicly humiliated and now a grateful underling with a ministerial portfolio as national security advisor approached the PM’s office every morning with a judicious expression. Invariably, he was impeccably attired, and frequently held a thin folder in one of his hands. And for what time they deemed necessary, Abay had almost exclusive access (but not always) to the PM while he briefed him on a range of national security developments, but which, according to sources, often ended up being dominated by the approaching elections.
In the meantime, Meles had insisted on preparing thoroughly for mass unrest, particularly in Addis, with a contingency plan even for an emergency evacuation of the palace. Tens of thousands of security personnel were trained and deployed in and around Addis: the latest vehicles and firearms were purchased and intelligence (both human and electronics) was beefed up. All part of a concerted effort “if possible, to deter; if not, to contain and crush riots.” Indeed, each stage of the plan had gone faultlessly; gratifying habitually worrying Meles. And they were all to be rewarded when Election Day came and went peacefully.
But what neither Meles Zenawi nor his security apparatus prepared for, nor foresee, was a party machine that was to deliver more than it was meant to (the 99 .6% “victory”) – a Pyrrhic victory that has shattered the moral foundation of the system.
Meles Zenawi approached the election by the book. He set a strategy: win the election by any means necessary. He afforded an efficient management: look no further than the tens of thousands of security personnel deployed with clockwork precision. He articulated a unique political vision: revolutionary democracy, as he eccentrically calls it. And he tried to establish a personality cult: women and youth were encouraged to wear t-shirts bearing his image. (Everyone stopped wearing them after the first day.)
What failed spectacularly, while he was busy elsewhere, was the judgment of his party underlings. Their obtuse single-mindedness has pushed the system to the brink by giving it an electoral “victory” that could be believed by none. This illustrates the chronic lack of quality middle-rankers---the true believers--- that is precariously dogging the EPRDF. In the hysteria that followed the 2005 elections, millions of new recruits were literally conscripted in to the EPRDF with no regard to standard recruitment guidelines. Many of them have moved up the ladder to middle ranking positions owing to superior education over long time members. There was an implicit, though not quite formally articulated, understanding to their mass enlistment: they will serve and they expect to be rewarded in return. It’s strictly a utilitarian relationship. And that is what essentially prevailed in this election. They were asked to deliver(by whatever means necessary); they did, and they expect to be rewarded. Beyond that, it’s for the real politicians to pick up the pieces.
The EPRDF leadership slyly recognizes that the absence of overt protests by the public is not an acknowledgment of the new status quo; which has palpably slammed the door on peaceful dissent in all but name. Neither does it need to be reminded of King Menelik, who after proclaiming one of his edicts inquired about the public’s reaction only to be told by thrilled aides that there were none, reportedly said, ‘ Ah, this means they are against it,’ to dramatize the public’s dangerously suppressed anger. This anger will sooner or later seek an outlet; it will not remain bottled up forever. And the indefensible “result” of the election has also fortuitously reduced the EPRDF grassroots---who, unlike the party’s top brass, live amongst the people--- in to an emotional wreak. No one is winning from this election “result.” This is where the role of Meles Zenawi is imperative to thwart a looming disaster for his party and the nation. His domination of his party is no more simply intellectual. A bungled election has elevated it to an emotional level as well. The party grassroots look up to him to lead them out of moral wilderness. He should rise up to the call of leadership and foresight.
Here is a roadmap for the EPRDF out of the quandary: even with the specious legal wrangling over a re-run over, it’s still possible for the EPRDF to legally realize fresh elections within the coming six months. What is needed is only the political will—really the will of Meles Zenawi—to dissolve the new parliament in accordance with Article 60 of the Constitution.
Here is the Constitution in its own words:
Ethiopian Constitution: Article 60
Dissolution of the House
1. With the consent of the House, the Prime Minister may cause the dissolution of the House before the expiry of its term in order to hold new elections.
2. The President may invite political parties to form a coalition government within one week, if the Council of Ministers of a previous coalition is dissolved because of the loss of its majority in the House. The House shall be dissolved and new elections shall be held if the political parties cannot agree to the continuation of the previous coalition or to form a new majority coalition.
3. If the House is dissolved pursuant to sub-Article 1 or 2 of this Article, new elections shall be held within six months of its dissolution.
4. The new House shall convene within thirty days of the conclusion of the elections.
5. Following the dissolution of the House, the previous governing party of coalition of parties shall continue as a caretaker government. Beyond conducting the day to day affairs of government and organizing new elections, it may not enact new proclamations, regulations or decrees, nor may it repeal or amend any existing law.(End of Article.)
Sub Article 1 is evidently originally tailored for the enduring EPRDF strategy to hold onto power up to the last minute, and when on the verge of being overwhelmed negotiate within the confines of the Constitution. But whatever the Machiavellian intent of its framers may have been, it also gives both the PM and the EPRDF the legal framework to correct the present crisis brought about by the ridiculous margin of “victory”. They need to seize it and employ it to the advantage of the nation.
As is clearly stipulated in sub-Article 1, the PM can dissolve parliament by the consent of its majority for what ever reason he sees fit. And what better raison d'être than an election result discredited by even those who voted for the “winning” party. Only a simple majority is required for dissolution, not a two thirds super-majority. But even if the law had required a super majority, no doubt that EPRDF parliamentarians can be counted on to deliver every single vote required. Parliamentarians are expected to vote for the party line at all times. Unlike most democracies, conscience is belligerently discouraged from playing a role in how they vote. In fact, party teaching maintains that seats won under the banner the party belongs to the EPRDF; for it to use as it thinks best. A diversion is defined as a breach of contract between voter and parliamentarian. The penalty is a swift recall, as had once happened against Seye Abraha et al after their fallout with Meles Zenawi. Parliamentarians will challenge the ethos only at the certain peril of their political careers. Few will dare to tread on that path if the EPRDF leadership is to opt for a re-run. But in all likelihood, it is safe to assume that they are less than enthusiastic about joining a thoroughly discredited parliament and would welcome a fresh election that offer them some chance of being elected legitimately.
Once a vote of dissolution is carried out successfully, what will remain is fresh elections in accordance with sub-Article 3 within six months. Such an opening for the nation and the EPRDF, entirely within the legal and constitutional framework, something the EPRDF is adamant about, is what Meles should be encouraged to do by his true friends--- his true local and international friends.
Saturday, June 26, 2010
Battle for the Nile as rivals lay claim to Africa's great river
With crises of population and resources upstream, there is now deadlock over who owns the Nile
Xan Rice in Jinja, Lake Victoria- guardian.co.uk
Simon Kitra's back garden looks out over the world's second-largest freshwater lake. His front lawn opens onto the world's longest river. If the 20-year-old Ugandan fisherman needs reminding of where his tiny island is, he can look up to the pink obelisk on the hillside, marking where the British explorer John Hanning Speke, sextant in hand, stood in 1862 to ascertain the point where Lake Victoria begins to empty — the source of the Nile.
The water that sustains Kitra – he drinks it, bathes in it, and eats and sells the fish which swim in it — slips gently and quietly past his canoe on its three-month, 3,470-mile journey to the Mediterranean. But at night, when he listens to his radio before casting his nets, news of the Nile's future is all anger and recriminations, stretching from its most remote headwaters in Burundi all the way to Egypt.
For a decade the nine states in the Nile basin have been negotiating on how best to share and protect the river in a time of changing climates, environmental threats and exploding populations. Now, with an agreement put on the table, talks have broken down in acrimony. On one side are the seven states that supply virtually all the Nile's flow. On the other are Egypt and Sudan, whose desert climates make the Nile's water their lifeblood. "This is serious," said Henriette Ndombe, executive director of the intergovernmental Nile Basin Initiative , established in 1999 to oversee the negotiation process and enhance co-operation. "This could be the beginning of a conflict."
The sticking point between the two groups is a question going back to colonial times: who owns the Nile's water? Kitra's answer – "It is for all of us" – might seem obvious. But Egypt and Sudan claim to have the law on their side. Treaties in 1929 and 1959, when Britain controlled much of the region, granted the two states "full utilisation of the Nile waters" – and the power to veto any water development projects in the catchment area in east Africa. The upstream states, including Ethiopia, source of the Blue Nile, which merges with the White Nile at Khartoum, and supplies 86% of the river's eventual flow, were allocated nothing.
However debatable its claim under international law, Egypt strongly defends it, sometimes with threats of military action. For decades it had an engineer posted at Uganda's Owen Falls dam on the Nile, close to Kitra's island, monitoring the outflow.
But in a sign of the growing discord, Uganda stopped supplying the engineer with data two years ago, according to Callist Tindimugaya, its commissioner for water resources regulation. And when Egypt and Sudan refused to sign the agreement in April on "equitable and reasonable" use of the Nile unless it protected their "historic rights" the other states lost patience. Isaac Musumba, Uganda's state minister for regional affairs, and its Nile representative, said: "We were saying: 'This is crazy! You cannot claim these rights without obligations'." Minelik Alemu Getahun, one of Ethiopia's negotiators, said all the upstream states saw the move by Egypt (Sudan has a more passive role) as "tantamount to an insult".
Ugandans endorse this stance. Ronald Kassamba, 24, scything grass along the banks of the Nile near Jinja, 50 miles from the capital Kampala, said: "Egypt is being very unfair. We have the source, so we should also be able to use the water."
Convinced that from their point of view there was no purpose in more talks, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania signed a "River Nile Basin Co-operative Framework" agreement in May. Kenya followed, and Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo look likely to do so – causing alarm and anger in Egypt. When parliaments in six states ratify the deal, a permanent commission to decide on water allocation will be set up – without the two states that need the river most.
Opposition by the upstream states to the colonial treaties is not new. Ethiopia was never colonised, and rejected the 1959 bilateral agreement that gave Egypt three-quarters of the Nile's annual flow (55.5bn cubic metres) and Sudan a quarter, even before it was signed. Most of the east African states also refused to recognise it, and earlier Nile treaties agreed by Britain on their behalf, when they became independent in the 1960s.
A combination of factors, including instability, poor governance, financial constraints and the availability of other water sources, meant the matter remained dormant. It was in the 1990s that various governments seriously started to consider using their Nile Basin waters to generate energy and irrigate crops. But when funding applications were made to the World Bank and others, problems arose. "Our development partners would always ask what other countries on the Nile were saying," said John Rao Nyaoro, Kenya's director of water resources. "We needed a clearing house for these projects," which will be a function of the Nile commission.
Officials in Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, which all have significant, if increasingly unreliable, rainfall, do acknowledge Egypt's huge dependence on the Nile and its right to a large part of its flow. But they say it is unreasonable to ask them to leave a valuable resource untouched, as the demand increases due to the changing climate and, especially, population growth. Egypt's population of 79 million is expected to reach 122 million by 2050, according to the Population Reference Bureau . But in the upstream states the growth is even faster. There are 83 million Ethiopians today, but in 40 years there will be 150 million. In Uganda, where the average number of children per woman is 6.7, one of the highest in the world, the population is due to more than triple over the same period to 97 million. For Uganda, the priority for now is electricity, and it wants to build more dams.
Ethiopia has begun a hydropower development, opening a dam at Lake Tana, the Blue Nile's source, and is in talks with Egypt and Sudan to build several more dams on the river. The electricity will be shared among the states – the mutual benefit envisaged when the Nile Basin Initiative was established. But Ethiopia also plans large irrigation schemes, which it says are essential for food. Tanzania has also talked of tapping Lake Victoria to supply dry villages in its north-west.
Under the agreement signed by five countries, each state's share of the Nile Basin water will depend on variables such as population, contribution to the river's flow, climate, social and economic needs, and, crucially, current and potential uses of the water – a factor which will heavily favour Egypt and Sudan.
The disputed article, in which Egypt and Sudan want their historic rights guaranteed and the other governments prefer to a clause where each nation agrees "not to significantly affect the water security of any country" – has been left out of the agreement, for further discussion.
This, the upstream states hope, leaves the door open for Egypt and Sudan to join them before the one-year signing period closes.
"Diplomacy will help us navigate this issue," said Musumba, the Ugandan minister, playing down any talk of conflict.
"What it is Egypt going to do – bomb us all?"
Water treaties
Agreements over the Nile's water date back to the late 19th century when Britain, which controlled Egypt and Sudan, signed deals with other colonial powers and with Ethiopia to guarantee the river's unimpeded flow. But, in 1929, a bilateral treaty went further. Egypt, which by then enjoyed nominal independence, and Britain, acting on behalf of Sudan and its other colonies around Lake Victoria, signed an agreement on water rights. It reserved the entire dry season flow of the Nile for Egypt and allowed Cairo to veto any water development project in the Nile basin .
In 1959, Egypt and the newly independent Sudan signed a deal that gave them "full utilisation of the Nile waters". Using the river's annual average flow of 84bn cubic metres of water, it was agreed that Egypt had the right to use 55.5bn cubic metres a year, with Sudan's share at 18.5bn cubic metres. The other 10bn cubic metres was reserved for seepage losses and evaporation in Lake Nasser, behind the Aswan dam. Upstream countries were not allocated a share.
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