Jeffrey Gettleman: Reporting From Mogadishu

NPR

Jeffrey Gettleman calls Somalia the "most dangerous place in the world."

The East Africa bureau chief for the New York Times tells Fresh Air's Terry Gross that the country — where violent rebels fight for control and wreak havoc in villages nationwide — is just as hopeless as it was in 1991, when the central government collapsed.

"There's no green zone. There's no one part of Somalia that's safe," Gettleman says. "That's the problem. In some of these other countries like Iraq or Afghanistan, where I've worked, there are conflict areas, there are lawless areas, but there's one part of the country that is somewhat stable, where if you needed help, you could get it. In Somalia, that doesn't really exist."

Gettleman has made more than a dozen trips to Somalia. Last year, he described the country in Foreign Policy as "a breeding ground for warlords, pirates, kidnappers, bomb makers, fanatical Islamist insurgents, freelance gunmen and idle, angry youth with no education and way too many bullets."


Gettleman, who recently wrote about the conscription of child soldiers by Somalia's own transitional government for the Times, says that despite the safety risks, he plans to continue reporting on the violence in East Africa.

"In the part of the world where I work, there are fewer and fewer journalists that have the resources, that have the bigger media organizations that can back them up, that can spend the money, that can take these risks and that can report these stories," he says.

"One of the consequences of the child-soldiers story we did was the government was so outraged ... that they have threatened the local Somali journalists that helped us report that story. And in some cases, some of the people who worked with us had to flee the country. And that's just an example of how difficult it is in many of these countries to illuminate what's happening

Interview Highlights

On ideology in African internal conflicts "What we're seeing across Africa today is many internal conflicts that have an absence of ideology. They're more criminally driven wars. From the reading I've done and compared to the liberation wars of yesteryear — in Eritrea, in Zimbabwe, in Ethiopia, even in Angola — there were causes back then. And of course there was criminality and violence, and there was gratuitous bloodshed, but it seemed like these rebel movements actually stood for something. They had popular support. ... Today it's totally different. The rebel populations prey upon the people they're supposed to be liberating. If you look in Congo, there are dozens of so-called rebel groups, and they have absolutely no popular support. In Somalia, you have the Shabab rebel group fighting against the government and trying to overthrow the weak transitional government in Somalia, and these guys are widely reviled by the Somali population. They're trying to impose a harsh and alien form of Islam, and the people are chafing under their rule, and they have very little popular support."

On child soldiers

"As these movements gravitate further and further away from having an ideological root, from having a real cause, there's basically no adults that want to join them. There's no reason to join them. They're left with trying to steal or kidnap or conscript children to fight their wars because no reasonable adult is going to join."

On why some African militias mutilate people

"I think it's a function of very weak states, that when you have these very poor countries, these things emerge and they take on an energy of their own. For example, the [militia group] LRA started out in Uganda in the late '80s, when the state was very weak. It wasn't very long ago that Idi Amin had brutalized the whole country. There had been a lot of political turmoil. The current government was just beginning to get some traction. And there were large parts of the country that were still chaotic. And [the LRA] was able to use that as first an excuse to exist and to fight against the government but then as a way to spread and operate because the government wasn't strong enough."

On the current state of Somalia

"It's probably the modern world's longest-running example of a chaotic state with no central government. This is despite billions of dollars, enormous diplomatic attention, one peace effort after another, and 20 years later, the place is chaotic and violent and hopeless, in many ways as it was in 1991 when the government collapsed."

On the ideological changes that have taken place in Somalia

"They're fighting each other and they have these cross-clan lines, and you have this new sort of axis of conflict. But the problem is when you have these places that remain mired in the state of anarchy for that long, every day that's like that, it gets harder and harder to reimpose authority. In Somalia, people adapt. They get used to the fact that there's no central government. Businessmen start schools. Neighborhoods band together to provide their own generators. I even saw, during my first visits to Mogadishu, a privatized mailbox where you buy a stamp from a businessman, stick it on a letter and stick it in a mailbox and they deliver it for you. And then you have this young generation in Somalia. These kids who haven't been in school for their entire lives, if they're 25 years or younger, basically this is all they know. They don't know what a functioning government does. They don't know the need for it."

To EPRDF: Dissolve new parliament (It's legal!)

By Eskinder Nega



The preparation for the elections in May 2010 was more than a year in the making in the PM’s office. Abay Tsehaye, once a fixture in popular imagination as one of several mystic leaders who were really running the EPRDF behind the public persona of Meles Zenawi, but later to be demystified, publicly humiliated and now a grateful underling with a ministerial portfolio as national security advisor approached the PM’s office every morning with a judicious expression. Invariably, he was impeccably attired, and frequently held a thin folder in one of his hands. And for what time they deemed necessary, Abay had almost exclusive access (but not always) to the PM while he briefed him on a range of national security developments, but which, according to sources, often ended up being dominated by the approaching elections.

In the meantime, Meles had insisted on preparing thoroughly for mass unrest, particularly in Addis, with a contingency plan even for an emergency evacuation of the palace. Tens of thousands of security personnel were trained and deployed in and around Addis: the latest vehicles and firearms were purchased and intelligence (both human and electronics) was beefed up. All part of a concerted effort “if possible, to deter; if not, to contain and crush riots.” Indeed, each stage of the plan had gone faultlessly; gratifying habitually worrying Meles. And they were all to be rewarded when Election Day came and went peacefully.

But what neither Meles Zenawi nor his security apparatus prepared for, nor foresee, was a party machine that was to deliver more than it was meant to (the 99 .6% “victory”) – a Pyrrhic victory that has shattered the moral foundation of the system.

Meles Zenawi approached the election by the book. He set a strategy: win the election by any means necessary. He afforded an efficient management: look no further than the tens of thousands of security personnel deployed with clockwork precision. He articulated a unique political vision: revolutionary democracy, as he eccentrically calls it. And he tried to establish a personality cult: women and youth were encouraged to wear t-shirts bearing his image. (Everyone stopped wearing them after the first day.)

What failed spectacularly, while he was busy elsewhere, was the judgment of his party underlings. Their obtuse single-mindedness has pushed the system to the brink by giving it an electoral “victory” that could be believed by none. This illustrates the chronic lack of quality middle-rankers---the true believers--- that is precariously dogging the EPRDF. In the hysteria that followed the 2005 elections, millions of new recruits were literally conscripted in to the EPRDF with no regard to standard recruitment guidelines. Many of them have moved up the ladder to middle ranking positions owing to superior education over long time members. There was an implicit, though not quite formally articulated, understanding to their mass enlistment: they will serve and they expect to be rewarded in return. It’s strictly a utilitarian relationship. And that is what essentially prevailed in this election. They were asked to deliver(by whatever means necessary); they did, and they expect to be rewarded. Beyond that, it’s for the real politicians to pick up the pieces.

The EPRDF leadership slyly recognizes that the absence of overt protests by the public is not an acknowledgment of the new status quo; which has palpably slammed the door on peaceful dissent in all but name. Neither does it need to be reminded of King Menelik, who after proclaiming one of his edicts inquired about the public’s reaction only to be told by thrilled aides that there were none, reportedly said, ‘ Ah, this means they are against it,’ to dramatize the public’s dangerously suppressed anger. This anger will sooner or later seek an outlet; it will not remain bottled up forever. And the indefensible “result” of the election has also fortuitously reduced the EPRDF grassroots---who, unlike the party’s top brass, live amongst the people--- in to an emotional wreak. No one is winning from this election “result.” This is where the role of Meles Zenawi is imperative to thwart a looming disaster for his party and the nation. His domination of his party is no more simply intellectual. A bungled election has elevated it to an emotional level as well. The party grassroots look up to him to lead them out of moral wilderness. He should rise up to the call of leadership and foresight.

Here is a roadmap for the EPRDF out of the quandary: even with the specious legal wrangling over a re-run over, it’s still possible for the EPRDF to legally realize fresh elections within the coming six months. What is needed is only the political will—really the will of Meles Zenawi—to dissolve the new parliament in accordance with Article 60 of the Constitution.

Here is the Constitution in its own words:


Ethiopian Constitution: Article 60

Dissolution of the House


1. With the consent of the House, the Prime Minister may cause the dissolution of the House before the expiry of its term in order to hold new elections.

2. The President may invite political parties to form a coalition government within one week, if the Council of Ministers of a previous coalition is dissolved because of the loss of its majority in the House. The House shall be dissolved and new elections shall be held if the political parties cannot agree to the continuation of the previous coalition or to form a new majority coalition.

3. If the House is dissolved pursuant to sub-Article 1 or 2 of this Article, new elections shall be held within six months of its dissolution.

4. The new House shall convene within thirty days of the conclusion of the elections.

5. Following the dissolution of the House, the previous governing party of coalition of parties shall continue as a caretaker government. Beyond conducting the day to day affairs of government and organizing new elections, it may not enact new proclamations, regulations or decrees, nor may it repeal or amend any existing law.(End of Article.)

Sub Article 1 is evidently originally tailored for the enduring EPRDF strategy to hold onto power up to the last minute, and when on the verge of being overwhelmed negotiate within the confines of the Constitution. But whatever the Machiavellian intent of its framers may have been, it also gives both the PM and the EPRDF the legal framework to correct the present crisis brought about by the ridiculous margin of “victory”. They need to seize it and employ it to the advantage of the nation.

As is clearly stipulated in sub-Article 1, the PM can dissolve parliament by the consent of its majority for what ever reason he sees fit. And what better raison d'être than an election result discredited by even those who voted for the “winning” party. Only a simple majority is required for dissolution, not a two thirds super-majority. But even if the law had required a super majority, no doubt that EPRDF parliamentarians can be counted on to deliver every single vote required. Parliamentarians are expected to vote for the party line at all times. Unlike most democracies, conscience is belligerently discouraged from playing a role in how they vote. In fact, party teaching maintains that seats won under the banner the party belongs to the EPRDF; for it to use as it thinks best. A diversion is defined as a breach of contract between voter and parliamentarian. The penalty is a swift recall, as had once happened against Seye Abraha et al after their fallout with Meles Zenawi. Parliamentarians will challenge the ethos only at the certain peril of their political careers. Few will dare to tread on that path if the EPRDF leadership is to opt for a re-run. But in all likelihood, it is safe to assume that they are less than enthusiastic about joining a thoroughly discredited parliament and would welcome a fresh election that offer them some chance of being elected legitimately.

Once a vote of dissolution is carried out successfully, what will remain is fresh elections in accordance with sub-Article 3 within six months. Such an opening for the nation and the EPRDF, entirely within the legal and constitutional framework, something the EPRDF is adamant about, is what Meles should be encouraged to do by his true friends--- his true local and international friends.