By PAUL GOLDSMITH - The East African
It is Sheikh Sharif’s moderate credentials that have seen him succeed the dysfunctional Abdullahi Yusuf as the ninth President of Somalia.
Elected by a parliament expanded to be more representative of the nation’s ethnic composition, he won 293 votes after the withdrawal of several candidates, and took the oath of office in Djibouti on January 31.
But the new president’s position is not substantially different from his predecessor’s, and Sharif inherits Somalia’s presidency at a time of severe challenges and deep political polarities.
If the country’s crises of hunger, poverty, dysfunctional politics and endemic violence also mirror opportunities, this is complicated by the complex array of forces, alliances, and clan factors arising since the collapse of the state in 1991.
While the rise of the Islamic Courts Union and Ethiopian intervention helped interrupt the vicious cycle of internal clan competition, the ideologically religious resistance to national reconciliation spearheaded by Al Shabaab, is in many ways even more destructive.
Still, there is perhaps a brief window of opportunity and new possibilities for the first time in a long time.
Sharif enjoys the support of his Abgal clan in northern Mogadishu and is likely to consolidate control of Mogadishu with the assistance of their fellow Hawiye Habr Gedir clan. This alone will elevate him above the two previous presidents. Click on 'Read More.'
Securing the capital is the best start he can hope for, ensuring the loyalty of the Transitional Federal Government’s 2,000 strong police force another plus.
The Unisom peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi, in contrast, are a political liability — underscored by last week’s incident where they reacted to a roadside bomb by indiscriminately firing on civilians.
Following the election, Al Shabaab and 14 Wahhabi factions met in Kismayu to declare their opposition to the new leadership.
The Ethiopian occupation provided the insurgents with the cover of nationalist resistance.
While their withdrawal weakens their legitimacy to a significant degree, they are continuing to recruit and train new fighters in the southern areas under their control.
In the meantime, persecution of their ulama and desecration of saints’ graves catalysed the formation of the As Sunnah al Jamaha, a movement led by Somalia’s traditional Sufi religious establishment.
Although a Somali journalist I spoke to in Nairobi dismissed As Sunnah forces as “a collection of old men and young boys,” the leadership boasts a multi-clan military command and has engaged Al Shabaab in nine battles since last November.
In January, they defeated Al Shabaab during an extended clash in Dusamareb, and now claim to control Somalia’s central region.
The As Sunnah leadership, however, remain suspicious of the new president’s intentions, citing his strong association with Salafi radicals like Hassan Dahir Aweis in the recent past.
The strong economic influence of the Wahhabi-dominated private sector and their antipathy for clan warlords incorporated into the TFG provide another counterpoint.
President Sharif was educated in Sufi institutions, linked to Egypt’s Al Azhar University, and was a member of the Ahmediyya — Somalia’s most conservative and reform-oriented Sufi tariqa — prior to going abroad to study.
This background, his association with the moderate Wahhabi faction of the former ICU, and the categorical rejection of his leadership by Al Shabaab, appears to favour the emergence of a TFG-As Sunnah alliance, which would ostensibly increase his military clout and broaden his territorial support.
The As Sunnah leadership, however, remain suspicious of the new president’s intentions, citing his strong association with Salafi radicals like Hassan Dahir Aweis in the recent past.
The strong economic influence of the Wahhabi-dominated private sector and their antipathy for clan warlords incorporated into the TFG provide another counterpoint.
These factors and Uganda’s role in removing Abdullahi Yusuf portray the new presidency as a poisoned chalice and Ahmed Sheikh Sharif as another transitional political leader doomed to fail.
But one must be wary of appearances and logical assumptions in Somalia — and, in any event, cultivating pro-government alliances is only part of the larger picture.
There are other more positive indicators suggesting the “Man of the Year” — as Sharif was anointed by one influential Somali website in 2006 — can prevail.
Despite the reality of being an executive without a state, the new president has demonstrated nationalist credentials and enjoys a level of political legitimacy far higher than his predecessors.
Like the new occupant of the White House, his skills in community organisation, social advocacy, and commitment to justice vaulted him into the political domain.
Considering the near-universal consensus on the failure of force to solve the nation’s problems and Somali’s cultural propensity for oral discourse, his main weapon is promoting national dialogue and the power to persuade.
He is popular across the diaspora while Al Shabaab’s assassination of journalists means Somalia’s strong electronic media and citizens abroad are natural allies on this front.
In addition to empowering voice, reciprocal rejection of Al Shabaab’s methods and demands, making Mogadishu secure, and reaching out to the elders’ councils that are the de facto local administration in most areas will work to isolate his enemies.
This will in turn provide a platform enabling the president-elect to use his fluency in Arabic and English to reach out to regional powers in order to end the proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea on Somali soil.
Somalia was the first country in Africa to peacefully replace a government in power through the vote.
There are many reasons to argue Somalia’s crisis is beyond peaceful resolution, but if Ahmed Sheikh Sharif achieves the goal of holding real on-the-ground elections in two years, his tenure will be a success.
