Sakharov Prize 2010: three finalists
Human rights − 18-10-2010 - 21:12
General
Israeli NGO Breaking the Silence, Cuban dissident Guillermo Fariñas and Ethiopian opposition leader Birtukan Mideksa are the three shortlisted finalists for the 2010 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. The winner will be announced on Thursday, 21 October, by the President of the European Parliament, following a decision of the Conference of political group leaders. The winner will receive €50,000 and will be invited to participate in the award ceremony on 15 December, in Strasbourg. The three finalists are presented below in alphabetical order.
Breaking the Silence is an Israeli NGO, established in 2004, by Israeli soldiers and veterans who collect and provide testimonies about their military service in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem during the second Intifada. The NGO is dedicated to exposing the Israeli public to the realities of the Israeli occupation, as seen through the eyes of Israeli soldiers, and to stirring debate about the impact of the prolonged occupation on the Palestinian population and on Israeli society. "If we vote for Breaking the Silence were are voting for peace, we are voting for the honour of Israeli democracy and we are saying we are in favour of two states: the Palestinian State and the Israeli State (...) Awarding the prize, we want to give peace a chance", declared Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Greens/EFA, FR).
Nominated by Rebecca Harms and Daniel Cohn-Bendit on behalf of the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) and by Lothar Bisky on behalf of the Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)
Guillermo Fariñas, aged 48, was nominated in the name of all those who fight in Cuba for freedom and human rights. He is a doctor of psychology, independent journalist and political dissident in Cuba. He has conducted 23 hunger strikes over the years "not in his own favour but in order to defend his compatriots" said José Ignacio Salafranca (EPP, ES). A supporter of non-violence who dares to denounce the Castro regime, "Guillermo Fariñas is a symbol in the struggle against the imprisonment of political opponents (). Because he is defending dignity and democracy in his country, he is the ideal candidate for the Sakharov Prize" say the MEPs who nominated him.
Nominated by Joseph Daul, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, Jaime Mayor Oreja, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Jarosław Leszek Wałęsa and Francisco José Millán Mon on the behalf of the Group of the European People's Party (EPP), by Edvard Kožušník for the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR), and by 91 other MEPs.
Birtukan MIDEKSA, an Ethiopian politician and former judge, is the leader of the opposition Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) party. On December 28 2008, Birtukan Mideska was re-arrested and imprisoned to serve a life sentence, after having spoken in Sweden with journalists about the way opposition leaders were released in her country. She was released from prison at the beginning of October, after almost two years' incarceration.
"The Saharov prize should be given to those who need international visibility and protection. Birtukan Mideksa needs both. By awarding the Saharov prize to Birtukan Mideksa, representing all Ethiopian political prisoners, the European Parliament would bring hope and would call attention to this young mother, one of the few female party leaders in Africa. It would also guarantee visibility of the struggle of thousands of forgotten political prisoners who fight for justice, the rule of law and democracy in Ethiopia", declared Adrian Severin (S&D, RO).
Nominated by Martin Schulz on behalf of the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D)
In the Chair: Eva JOLY (Greens/EFA, FR)
Monday, October 18, 2010
Sunday, October 17, 2010
Final Announcment: Let's go for Birtu! Let's Sign the Online Petition!
By Helen Niqusie, Germany
Under the fundamental rights of European citizens, Article 194 of the EC Treaty states that ‘any citizen of the European Union, or resident in a Member State, may, individually or in association with others, submit a petition to the European Parliament on a subject which comes within the European Union's fields of activity and which affects them directly.’
This right of petition to the European Parliament is a right one can exercise any time when s/he sees it fit. And it’s now time for us Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia to send out our petitions to Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to honor our heroine Birtukan Mideksa as the recipient of the prestigious Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. Please fill in this online petition made available by Freebirtukan.org and the Greeco-Gabonese Modelist and peace activist Gloria Mika and send it asap before Monday, October 18.
And here is the rest of it.
Under the fundamental rights of European citizens, Article 194 of the EC Treaty states that ‘any citizen of the European Union, or resident in a Member State, may, individually or in association with others, submit a petition to the European Parliament on a subject which comes within the European Union's fields of activity and which affects them directly.’
This right of petition to the European Parliament is a right one can exercise any time when s/he sees it fit. And it’s now time for us Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia to send out our petitions to Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to honor our heroine Birtukan Mideksa as the recipient of the prestigious Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. Please fill in this online petition made available by Freebirtukan.org and the Greeco-Gabonese Modelist and peace activist Gloria Mika and send it asap before Monday, October 18.
And here is the rest of it.
Wednesday, October 6, 2010
The arrest of Birtukan Mideksa was a criminal act in the first place
Press Release | October 6, 2010
Ethiopian civic, political and media groups as well as activists in the Diaspora held a meeting on Wednesday and issued the following statement on the release of Birtukan Mideksa.
After holding a sham election in May 2010, and forming a fake parliament and cabinet this week, Ethiopia's tyrant Meles Zenawi has released Birtukan Mideksa, chairperson of Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ), today.
It is well known that the regime re-arrested Birtukan Mideksa on December 29, 2008 on the filmsy charge that she was in violation of her terms of release by making a public statement that she did not ask for pardon in order to be released from prison in July 2007.
It is clear that the Meles regime had thrown Birtukan in jail illegally in preparation for the fake election that it planned for May 2010.
She has languished in jail from Nov. 2005 - July 2007, and again from December 2008 until this month under inhuman conditions. Both times her arrest was a criminal act and a violation of the regime's own constitution, proving once again that there is no rule of law in Ethiopia under the Meles’s regime.
As we prepare to commemorate the 5th anniversary of the massacre of pro-democracy protesters next month, we hold the Meles regime accountable for the illegal detention of Birtukan Mideksa and tens of thousands of other political prisoners in Ethiopia.
We also strongly urge the international community to:
- demand the immediate release of all political prisoners in Ethiopia;
- demand the opening of the political space;
- urge the regime to respect the rule of law and fully respect human and civil rights, including freedom of association, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press.
We will not rest until justice, freedom and democracy prevail in Ethiopia.
Contact: info@march4freedom.org
Phone: 202- 656 5117
Coalition of Ethiopian American and Ethiopian Political, Civic, and media organizations.
Birtu is Released!
By Eskinder Nega
Birtukan Mideksa, prominent Ethiopian political prisoner, was freed today from almost two years of absurd imprisonment---a blatant abuse of power by the EPRDF, specifically PM Meles Zenawi. She was accorded a hero’s welcome by family, relatives, friends and supporters. A press conference is due in few hours where her terms of release will be detailed.
Here is a synopsis of what had happened since mid- December 2008:
December 10 2008
The public face of the brutal Federal Police is startling. Clean shaven, tall, a little on the bulky side, urbane, and tastefully attired, he is in fact the opposite of the popular caricature of the uncouth and uneducated Federal Police officials. Werkeneh Gebeyehu , Commissioner of the Federal Police and its public face, though real power lie with his deputies, cut an impressive figure behind his desk as he spoke with Birtukan Mideksa on December 10 2008.
“What legal mandate does the Federal Police have in regard to this issue?” inquired Birtukan Mideksa, President of UDJ, an opposition party, after the Commissioner had winded down.
He smiled contemptuously before he answered. But her courage surprised him. This is probably the first time for him to personally experience it.
“This is no academic discourse,” he said, trying his best to deepen his voice. He was really caught off guard. This could hardly been discussed when he was instructed to speak with her by the battle-hardened leaders of the EPRDF. “I think its best if you avoid raising such kind of questions,” he said, almost unconsciously with who-cares-what-the- law-says tenor to his voice.
Werkenh recapped by insisting that the terms of Birtukan’s conditional pardon had been violated in Sweden; where, he alleged, she had publicly denied seeking pardon to get out of prison. He sought a public retraction. Birtukan parted with the Commissioner convinced that the EPRDF was out to frustrate her party’s prospects from the very outset.
December 23 2008
Almost two weeks later, Birtukan was again summoned by Werkeneh, this time courtesy of a warrant, which she demanded, to his lavish office in downtown Addis. It was to be a brief sojourn.
“You have three days to deliver a public retraction of your statement in Sweden to this office. If not, the government will assume that the pardon was secured under false pretense and revoke it,” he told her officiously. There was nothing more either side could say. An ultimatum had been delivered and a time-frame set. Upping the challenge, the demand was publicized on state media that night. The nation held its breath in suspense.
December 26 2008
Three days later, Birtukan responded publicly but ignored the demand to deliver it to Werkeneh’s office. In a brilliant piece she released to the press, she said:
"I have asked forgiveness through the elders by signing on the document dated June 18, 2006 in the spirit of reconciliation the elders championed and to bestow a political end to charges that were politically motivated. This is a fact that I cannot change even if I want to….To present a process that has complex features as a case that followed a normal legal process for asking forgiveness is either foolishness or ignorance….In my opinion, the real reasons behind all these illegal intimidation and warnings have nothing to do with transgressions of the law. The message is clear, and is not only for me but also for all those who are active in the peaceful struggle: A peaceful and law-abiding political struggle can be conducted only within the limits set by the ruling party, not the constitution."(End of quotation)
December 28 2008
What happened on December 28 is brilliantly here detailed by Professor Al Mariam, in a January 5 2010 commentary titled “In defense of Birtukan Mideksa:
That happened last week in Ethiopia. Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJP) President Ms. Bertukan Mideksa was strong-armed, manhandled and whisked away to the infamous Kality prison. In a VOA interview, Professor Mesfin Woldemariam, the aging human rights lion of Ethiopia, gave eyewitness testimony. On December 29, Prof. Mesfin was standing with Pastor Daniel and President Birtukan outside of Pastor Daniel’s office when four unmarked vehicles stormed on the scene. Approximately 10 unidentified armed men (thugs) exited the vehicles and violently grabbed President Birtukan and forcibly dragged her into their vehicle. Professor Mesfin attempted to reason with the abductors explaining that it was unnecessary to rough up President Birtukan as a simple summons would be enough to command her appearance in a court of law. At that point, the crew of thugs tongue-lashed Prof. Mesfin with a torrent of insults. One of the thugs assaulted the nearly 80-year old professor savagely with the butt of his rifle almost knocking him to the ground. Prof. Mesfin suffered blunt force trauma injury to his abdominal area in the unprovoked assault. He was rushed for medical assistance, and reports indicate that he is undergoing extensive tests to determine the extent of his injury. (It is to be remembered that Prof. Mesfin underwent major surgery in India a little over a year ago.) President Birtukan’s driver, Ato Abdurahman Ahmed, was also beaten mercilessly by the thugs.(End of quotation)
Post December 28 2008
Asked abourt Birtukan’s imprisonment, Meles Zenawi, was adamant that she will not be freed. “ It will undermine the process,” he said repeatedly. She had her one chance. Of course no one believed him; not even his steady admirers.
Of the last time he spoke about her in Ethiopia, I wrote:
Posing defiantly before probing journalists after a universally mocked “election victory” , Meles Zenawi,PM, whose party “won” 99.6% of parliamentary seats, spoke about her harshly, but noticeably absent the typical ardor: “This(her release) is a purely legal issue, and it is between her and the law. No one can come between the two. No one. Not opposition parties, not our friends abroad."
Much to the relief of the public,however, long attuned to reading between the lines of its official’s doublespeak, her release is not a “dead issue,” as has been land privatization for the entirety of his party’s existence. And by the dismal standards of the times, when the dominance of the EPRDF is overbearing, this is cause for optimism. There is room for her release short of a revolutionary overhaul.(End of quotation.)
September 22 2010
Meles responds to query about Birtukan's imprisonment at Columbia University. " I wouldn't be surprised if she were to ask for a pardon. And I wouldn't be surprised if the government was to grant it to her," he said.
Few days later, "mediators" leaked news of her imminent release. Family members also quietly confirm her pending release.
October 4 2010
Mediators inform journalists of a planned press conference on October 5 2010. The theme: Bitrtuka's release. It's now semi-official. Less than twenty four hours to go!
October 5 2010
Unnamed government officials confirm her release "There was no bargaining. This is purely a magnanimous act by the government," said one unnamed government official haughtily to local papers.An obvious attempt to dampen the celebratory mood. (Won't work, guys!!! She is a heroine in the eyes of millions! Give it up!!)
Birtukan is finally FREE! Accorded a hero's welcome.
Saturday, July 3, 2010
Jeffrey Gettleman: Reporting From Mogadishu
NPRJeffrey Gettleman calls Somalia the "most dangerous place in the world."
The East Africa bureau chief for the New York Times tells Fresh Air's Terry Gross that the country — where violent rebels fight for control and wreak havoc in villages nationwide — is just as hopeless as it was in 1991, when the central government collapsed.
"There's no green zone. There's no one part of Somalia that's safe," Gettleman says. "That's the problem. In some of these other countries like Iraq or Afghanistan, where I've worked, there are conflict areas, there are lawless areas, but there's one part of the country that is somewhat stable, where if you needed help, you could get it. In Somalia, that doesn't really exist."
Gettleman has made more than a dozen trips to Somalia. Last year, he described the country in Foreign Policy as "a breeding ground for warlords, pirates, kidnappers, bomb makers, fanatical Islamist insurgents, freelance gunmen and idle, angry youth with no education and way too many bullets."
Gettleman, who recently wrote about the conscription of child soldiers by Somalia's own transitional government for the Times, says that despite the safety risks, he plans to continue reporting on the violence in East Africa.
"In the part of the world where I work, there are fewer and fewer journalists that have the resources, that have the bigger media organizations that can back them up, that can spend the money, that can take these risks and that can report these stories," he says.
"One of the consequences of the child-soldiers story we did was the government was so outraged ... that they have threatened the local Somali journalists that helped us report that story. And in some cases, some of the people who worked with us had to flee the country. And that's just an example of how difficult it is in many of these countries to illuminate what's happening
Interview Highlights
On ideology in African internal conflicts "What we're seeing across Africa today is many internal conflicts that have an absence of ideology. They're more criminally driven wars. From the reading I've done and compared to the liberation wars of yesteryear — in Eritrea, in Zimbabwe, in Ethiopia, even in Angola — there were causes back then. And of course there was criminality and violence, and there was gratuitous bloodshed, but it seemed like these rebel movements actually stood for something. They had popular support. ... Today it's totally different. The rebel populations prey upon the people they're supposed to be liberating. If you look in Congo, there are dozens of so-called rebel groups, and they have absolutely no popular support. In Somalia, you have the Shabab rebel group fighting against the government and trying to overthrow the weak transitional government in Somalia, and these guys are widely reviled by the Somali population. They're trying to impose a harsh and alien form of Islam, and the people are chafing under their rule, and they have very little popular support."
On child soldiers
"As these movements gravitate further and further away from having an ideological root, from having a real cause, there's basically no adults that want to join them. There's no reason to join them. They're left with trying to steal or kidnap or conscript children to fight their wars because no reasonable adult is going to join."
On why some African militias mutilate people
"I think it's a function of very weak states, that when you have these very poor countries, these things emerge and they take on an energy of their own. For example, the [militia group] LRA started out in Uganda in the late '80s, when the state was very weak. It wasn't very long ago that Idi Amin had brutalized the whole country. There had been a lot of political turmoil. The current government was just beginning to get some traction. And there were large parts of the country that were still chaotic. And [the LRA] was able to use that as first an excuse to exist and to fight against the government but then as a way to spread and operate because the government wasn't strong enough."
On the current state of Somalia
"It's probably the modern world's longest-running example of a chaotic state with no central government. This is despite billions of dollars, enormous diplomatic attention, one peace effort after another, and 20 years later, the place is chaotic and violent and hopeless, in many ways as it was in 1991 when the government collapsed."
On the ideological changes that have taken place in Somalia
"They're fighting each other and they have these cross-clan lines, and you have this new sort of axis of conflict. But the problem is when you have these places that remain mired in the state of anarchy for that long, every day that's like that, it gets harder and harder to reimpose authority. In Somalia, people adapt. They get used to the fact that there's no central government. Businessmen start schools. Neighborhoods band together to provide their own generators. I even saw, during my first visits to Mogadishu, a privatized mailbox where you buy a stamp from a businessman, stick it on a letter and stick it in a mailbox and they deliver it for you. And then you have this young generation in Somalia. These kids who haven't been in school for their entire lives, if they're 25 years or younger, basically this is all they know. They don't know what a functioning government does. They don't know the need for it."
To EPRDF: Dissolve new parliament (It's legal!)
By Eskinder Nega
The preparation for the elections in May 2010 was more than a year in the making in the PM’s office. Abay Tsehaye, once a fixture in popular imagination as one of several mystic leaders who were really running the EPRDF behind the public persona of Meles Zenawi, but later to be demystified, publicly humiliated and now a grateful underling with a ministerial portfolio as national security advisor approached the PM’s office every morning with a judicious expression. Invariably, he was impeccably attired, and frequently held a thin folder in one of his hands. And for what time they deemed necessary, Abay had almost exclusive access (but not always) to the PM while he briefed him on a range of national security developments, but which, according to sources, often ended up being dominated by the approaching elections.
In the meantime, Meles had insisted on preparing thoroughly for mass unrest, particularly in Addis, with a contingency plan even for an emergency evacuation of the palace. Tens of thousands of security personnel were trained and deployed in and around Addis: the latest vehicles and firearms were purchased and intelligence (both human and electronics) was beefed up. All part of a concerted effort “if possible, to deter; if not, to contain and crush riots.” Indeed, each stage of the plan had gone faultlessly; gratifying habitually worrying Meles. And they were all to be rewarded when Election Day came and went peacefully.
But what neither Meles Zenawi nor his security apparatus prepared for, nor foresee, was a party machine that was to deliver more than it was meant to (the 99 .6% “victory”) – a Pyrrhic victory that has shattered the moral foundation of the system.
Meles Zenawi approached the election by the book. He set a strategy: win the election by any means necessary. He afforded an efficient management: look no further than the tens of thousands of security personnel deployed with clockwork precision. He articulated a unique political vision: revolutionary democracy, as he eccentrically calls it. And he tried to establish a personality cult: women and youth were encouraged to wear t-shirts bearing his image. (Everyone stopped wearing them after the first day.)
What failed spectacularly, while he was busy elsewhere, was the judgment of his party underlings. Their obtuse single-mindedness has pushed the system to the brink by giving it an electoral “victory” that could be believed by none. This illustrates the chronic lack of quality middle-rankers---the true believers--- that is precariously dogging the EPRDF. In the hysteria that followed the 2005 elections, millions of new recruits were literally conscripted in to the EPRDF with no regard to standard recruitment guidelines. Many of them have moved up the ladder to middle ranking positions owing to superior education over long time members. There was an implicit, though not quite formally articulated, understanding to their mass enlistment: they will serve and they expect to be rewarded in return. It’s strictly a utilitarian relationship. And that is what essentially prevailed in this election. They were asked to deliver(by whatever means necessary); they did, and they expect to be rewarded. Beyond that, it’s for the real politicians to pick up the pieces.
The EPRDF leadership slyly recognizes that the absence of overt protests by the public is not an acknowledgment of the new status quo; which has palpably slammed the door on peaceful dissent in all but name. Neither does it need to be reminded of King Menelik, who after proclaiming one of his edicts inquired about the public’s reaction only to be told by thrilled aides that there were none, reportedly said, ‘ Ah, this means they are against it,’ to dramatize the public’s dangerously suppressed anger. This anger will sooner or later seek an outlet; it will not remain bottled up forever. And the indefensible “result” of the election has also fortuitously reduced the EPRDF grassroots---who, unlike the party’s top brass, live amongst the people--- in to an emotional wreak. No one is winning from this election “result.” This is where the role of Meles Zenawi is imperative to thwart a looming disaster for his party and the nation. His domination of his party is no more simply intellectual. A bungled election has elevated it to an emotional level as well. The party grassroots look up to him to lead them out of moral wilderness. He should rise up to the call of leadership and foresight.
Here is a roadmap for the EPRDF out of the quandary: even with the specious legal wrangling over a re-run over, it’s still possible for the EPRDF to legally realize fresh elections within the coming six months. What is needed is only the political will—really the will of Meles Zenawi—to dissolve the new parliament in accordance with Article 60 of the Constitution.
Here is the Constitution in its own words:
Ethiopian Constitution: Article 60
Dissolution of the House
1. With the consent of the House, the Prime Minister may cause the dissolution of the House before the expiry of its term in order to hold new elections.
2. The President may invite political parties to form a coalition government within one week, if the Council of Ministers of a previous coalition is dissolved because of the loss of its majority in the House. The House shall be dissolved and new elections shall be held if the political parties cannot agree to the continuation of the previous coalition or to form a new majority coalition.
3. If the House is dissolved pursuant to sub-Article 1 or 2 of this Article, new elections shall be held within six months of its dissolution.
4. The new House shall convene within thirty days of the conclusion of the elections.
5. Following the dissolution of the House, the previous governing party of coalition of parties shall continue as a caretaker government. Beyond conducting the day to day affairs of government and organizing new elections, it may not enact new proclamations, regulations or decrees, nor may it repeal or amend any existing law.(End of Article.)
Sub Article 1 is evidently originally tailored for the enduring EPRDF strategy to hold onto power up to the last minute, and when on the verge of being overwhelmed negotiate within the confines of the Constitution. But whatever the Machiavellian intent of its framers may have been, it also gives both the PM and the EPRDF the legal framework to correct the present crisis brought about by the ridiculous margin of “victory”. They need to seize it and employ it to the advantage of the nation.
As is clearly stipulated in sub-Article 1, the PM can dissolve parliament by the consent of its majority for what ever reason he sees fit. And what better raison d'être than an election result discredited by even those who voted for the “winning” party. Only a simple majority is required for dissolution, not a two thirds super-majority. But even if the law had required a super majority, no doubt that EPRDF parliamentarians can be counted on to deliver every single vote required. Parliamentarians are expected to vote for the party line at all times. Unlike most democracies, conscience is belligerently discouraged from playing a role in how they vote. In fact, party teaching maintains that seats won under the banner the party belongs to the EPRDF; for it to use as it thinks best. A diversion is defined as a breach of contract between voter and parliamentarian. The penalty is a swift recall, as had once happened against Seye Abraha et al after their fallout with Meles Zenawi. Parliamentarians will challenge the ethos only at the certain peril of their political careers. Few will dare to tread on that path if the EPRDF leadership is to opt for a re-run. But in all likelihood, it is safe to assume that they are less than enthusiastic about joining a thoroughly discredited parliament and would welcome a fresh election that offer them some chance of being elected legitimately.
Once a vote of dissolution is carried out successfully, what will remain is fresh elections in accordance with sub-Article 3 within six months. Such an opening for the nation and the EPRDF, entirely within the legal and constitutional framework, something the EPRDF is adamant about, is what Meles should be encouraged to do by his true friends--- his true local and international friends.
The preparation for the elections in May 2010 was more than a year in the making in the PM’s office. Abay Tsehaye, once a fixture in popular imagination as one of several mystic leaders who were really running the EPRDF behind the public persona of Meles Zenawi, but later to be demystified, publicly humiliated and now a grateful underling with a ministerial portfolio as national security advisor approached the PM’s office every morning with a judicious expression. Invariably, he was impeccably attired, and frequently held a thin folder in one of his hands. And for what time they deemed necessary, Abay had almost exclusive access (but not always) to the PM while he briefed him on a range of national security developments, but which, according to sources, often ended up being dominated by the approaching elections.
In the meantime, Meles had insisted on preparing thoroughly for mass unrest, particularly in Addis, with a contingency plan even for an emergency evacuation of the palace. Tens of thousands of security personnel were trained and deployed in and around Addis: the latest vehicles and firearms were purchased and intelligence (both human and electronics) was beefed up. All part of a concerted effort “if possible, to deter; if not, to contain and crush riots.” Indeed, each stage of the plan had gone faultlessly; gratifying habitually worrying Meles. And they were all to be rewarded when Election Day came and went peacefully.
But what neither Meles Zenawi nor his security apparatus prepared for, nor foresee, was a party machine that was to deliver more than it was meant to (the 99 .6% “victory”) – a Pyrrhic victory that has shattered the moral foundation of the system.
Meles Zenawi approached the election by the book. He set a strategy: win the election by any means necessary. He afforded an efficient management: look no further than the tens of thousands of security personnel deployed with clockwork precision. He articulated a unique political vision: revolutionary democracy, as he eccentrically calls it. And he tried to establish a personality cult: women and youth were encouraged to wear t-shirts bearing his image. (Everyone stopped wearing them after the first day.)
What failed spectacularly, while he was busy elsewhere, was the judgment of his party underlings. Their obtuse single-mindedness has pushed the system to the brink by giving it an electoral “victory” that could be believed by none. This illustrates the chronic lack of quality middle-rankers---the true believers--- that is precariously dogging the EPRDF. In the hysteria that followed the 2005 elections, millions of new recruits were literally conscripted in to the EPRDF with no regard to standard recruitment guidelines. Many of them have moved up the ladder to middle ranking positions owing to superior education over long time members. There was an implicit, though not quite formally articulated, understanding to their mass enlistment: they will serve and they expect to be rewarded in return. It’s strictly a utilitarian relationship. And that is what essentially prevailed in this election. They were asked to deliver(by whatever means necessary); they did, and they expect to be rewarded. Beyond that, it’s for the real politicians to pick up the pieces.
The EPRDF leadership slyly recognizes that the absence of overt protests by the public is not an acknowledgment of the new status quo; which has palpably slammed the door on peaceful dissent in all but name. Neither does it need to be reminded of King Menelik, who after proclaiming one of his edicts inquired about the public’s reaction only to be told by thrilled aides that there were none, reportedly said, ‘ Ah, this means they are against it,’ to dramatize the public’s dangerously suppressed anger. This anger will sooner or later seek an outlet; it will not remain bottled up forever. And the indefensible “result” of the election has also fortuitously reduced the EPRDF grassroots---who, unlike the party’s top brass, live amongst the people--- in to an emotional wreak. No one is winning from this election “result.” This is where the role of Meles Zenawi is imperative to thwart a looming disaster for his party and the nation. His domination of his party is no more simply intellectual. A bungled election has elevated it to an emotional level as well. The party grassroots look up to him to lead them out of moral wilderness. He should rise up to the call of leadership and foresight.
Here is a roadmap for the EPRDF out of the quandary: even with the specious legal wrangling over a re-run over, it’s still possible for the EPRDF to legally realize fresh elections within the coming six months. What is needed is only the political will—really the will of Meles Zenawi—to dissolve the new parliament in accordance with Article 60 of the Constitution.
Here is the Constitution in its own words:
Ethiopian Constitution: Article 60
Dissolution of the House
1. With the consent of the House, the Prime Minister may cause the dissolution of the House before the expiry of its term in order to hold new elections.
2. The President may invite political parties to form a coalition government within one week, if the Council of Ministers of a previous coalition is dissolved because of the loss of its majority in the House. The House shall be dissolved and new elections shall be held if the political parties cannot agree to the continuation of the previous coalition or to form a new majority coalition.
3. If the House is dissolved pursuant to sub-Article 1 or 2 of this Article, new elections shall be held within six months of its dissolution.
4. The new House shall convene within thirty days of the conclusion of the elections.
5. Following the dissolution of the House, the previous governing party of coalition of parties shall continue as a caretaker government. Beyond conducting the day to day affairs of government and organizing new elections, it may not enact new proclamations, regulations or decrees, nor may it repeal or amend any existing law.(End of Article.)
Sub Article 1 is evidently originally tailored for the enduring EPRDF strategy to hold onto power up to the last minute, and when on the verge of being overwhelmed negotiate within the confines of the Constitution. But whatever the Machiavellian intent of its framers may have been, it also gives both the PM and the EPRDF the legal framework to correct the present crisis brought about by the ridiculous margin of “victory”. They need to seize it and employ it to the advantage of the nation.
As is clearly stipulated in sub-Article 1, the PM can dissolve parliament by the consent of its majority for what ever reason he sees fit. And what better raison d'être than an election result discredited by even those who voted for the “winning” party. Only a simple majority is required for dissolution, not a two thirds super-majority. But even if the law had required a super majority, no doubt that EPRDF parliamentarians can be counted on to deliver every single vote required. Parliamentarians are expected to vote for the party line at all times. Unlike most democracies, conscience is belligerently discouraged from playing a role in how they vote. In fact, party teaching maintains that seats won under the banner the party belongs to the EPRDF; for it to use as it thinks best. A diversion is defined as a breach of contract between voter and parliamentarian. The penalty is a swift recall, as had once happened against Seye Abraha et al after their fallout with Meles Zenawi. Parliamentarians will challenge the ethos only at the certain peril of their political careers. Few will dare to tread on that path if the EPRDF leadership is to opt for a re-run. But in all likelihood, it is safe to assume that they are less than enthusiastic about joining a thoroughly discredited parliament and would welcome a fresh election that offer them some chance of being elected legitimately.
Once a vote of dissolution is carried out successfully, what will remain is fresh elections in accordance with sub-Article 3 within six months. Such an opening for the nation and the EPRDF, entirely within the legal and constitutional framework, something the EPRDF is adamant about, is what Meles should be encouraged to do by his true friends--- his true local and international friends.
Saturday, June 26, 2010
Battle for the Nile as rivals lay claim to Africa's great river
With crises of population and resources upstream, there is now deadlock over who owns the Nile
Xan Rice in Jinja, Lake Victoria- guardian.co.uk
Simon Kitra's back garden looks out over the world's second-largest freshwater lake. His front lawn opens onto the world's longest river. If the 20-year-old Ugandan fisherman needs reminding of where his tiny island is, he can look up to the pink obelisk on the hillside, marking where the British explorer John Hanning Speke, sextant in hand, stood in 1862 to ascertain the point where Lake Victoria begins to empty — the source of the Nile.
The water that sustains Kitra – he drinks it, bathes in it, and eats and sells the fish which swim in it — slips gently and quietly past his canoe on its three-month, 3,470-mile journey to the Mediterranean. But at night, when he listens to his radio before casting his nets, news of the Nile's future is all anger and recriminations, stretching from its most remote headwaters in Burundi all the way to Egypt.
For a decade the nine states in the Nile basin have been negotiating on how best to share and protect the river in a time of changing climates, environmental threats and exploding populations. Now, with an agreement put on the table, talks have broken down in acrimony. On one side are the seven states that supply virtually all the Nile's flow. On the other are Egypt and Sudan, whose desert climates make the Nile's water their lifeblood. "This is serious," said Henriette Ndombe, executive director of the intergovernmental Nile Basin Initiative , established in 1999 to oversee the negotiation process and enhance co-operation. "This could be the beginning of a conflict."
The sticking point between the two groups is a question going back to colonial times: who owns the Nile's water? Kitra's answer – "It is for all of us" – might seem obvious. But Egypt and Sudan claim to have the law on their side. Treaties in 1929 and 1959, when Britain controlled much of the region, granted the two states "full utilisation of the Nile waters" – and the power to veto any water development projects in the catchment area in east Africa. The upstream states, including Ethiopia, source of the Blue Nile, which merges with the White Nile at Khartoum, and supplies 86% of the river's eventual flow, were allocated nothing.
However debatable its claim under international law, Egypt strongly defends it, sometimes with threats of military action. For decades it had an engineer posted at Uganda's Owen Falls dam on the Nile, close to Kitra's island, monitoring the outflow.
But in a sign of the growing discord, Uganda stopped supplying the engineer with data two years ago, according to Callist Tindimugaya, its commissioner for water resources regulation. And when Egypt and Sudan refused to sign the agreement in April on "equitable and reasonable" use of the Nile unless it protected their "historic rights" the other states lost patience. Isaac Musumba, Uganda's state minister for regional affairs, and its Nile representative, said: "We were saying: 'This is crazy! You cannot claim these rights without obligations'." Minelik Alemu Getahun, one of Ethiopia's negotiators, said all the upstream states saw the move by Egypt (Sudan has a more passive role) as "tantamount to an insult".
Ugandans endorse this stance. Ronald Kassamba, 24, scything grass along the banks of the Nile near Jinja, 50 miles from the capital Kampala, said: "Egypt is being very unfair. We have the source, so we should also be able to use the water."
Convinced that from their point of view there was no purpose in more talks, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania signed a "River Nile Basin Co-operative Framework" agreement in May. Kenya followed, and Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo look likely to do so – causing alarm and anger in Egypt. When parliaments in six states ratify the deal, a permanent commission to decide on water allocation will be set up – without the two states that need the river most.
Opposition by the upstream states to the colonial treaties is not new. Ethiopia was never colonised, and rejected the 1959 bilateral agreement that gave Egypt three-quarters of the Nile's annual flow (55.5bn cubic metres) and Sudan a quarter, even before it was signed. Most of the east African states also refused to recognise it, and earlier Nile treaties agreed by Britain on their behalf, when they became independent in the 1960s.
A combination of factors, including instability, poor governance, financial constraints and the availability of other water sources, meant the matter remained dormant. It was in the 1990s that various governments seriously started to consider using their Nile Basin waters to generate energy and irrigate crops. But when funding applications were made to the World Bank and others, problems arose. "Our development partners would always ask what other countries on the Nile were saying," said John Rao Nyaoro, Kenya's director of water resources. "We needed a clearing house for these projects," which will be a function of the Nile commission.
Officials in Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, which all have significant, if increasingly unreliable, rainfall, do acknowledge Egypt's huge dependence on the Nile and its right to a large part of its flow. But they say it is unreasonable to ask them to leave a valuable resource untouched, as the demand increases due to the changing climate and, especially, population growth. Egypt's population of 79 million is expected to reach 122 million by 2050, according to the Population Reference Bureau . But in the upstream states the growth is even faster. There are 83 million Ethiopians today, but in 40 years there will be 150 million. In Uganda, where the average number of children per woman is 6.7, one of the highest in the world, the population is due to more than triple over the same period to 97 million. For Uganda, the priority for now is electricity, and it wants to build more dams.
Ethiopia has begun a hydropower development, opening a dam at Lake Tana, the Blue Nile's source, and is in talks with Egypt and Sudan to build several more dams on the river. The electricity will be shared among the states – the mutual benefit envisaged when the Nile Basin Initiative was established. But Ethiopia also plans large irrigation schemes, which it says are essential for food. Tanzania has also talked of tapping Lake Victoria to supply dry villages in its north-west.
Under the agreement signed by five countries, each state's share of the Nile Basin water will depend on variables such as population, contribution to the river's flow, climate, social and economic needs, and, crucially, current and potential uses of the water – a factor which will heavily favour Egypt and Sudan.
The disputed article, in which Egypt and Sudan want their historic rights guaranteed and the other governments prefer to a clause where each nation agrees "not to significantly affect the water security of any country" – has been left out of the agreement, for further discussion.
This, the upstream states hope, leaves the door open for Egypt and Sudan to join them before the one-year signing period closes.
"Diplomacy will help us navigate this issue," said Musumba, the Ugandan minister, playing down any talk of conflict.
"What it is Egypt going to do – bomb us all?"
Water treaties
Agreements over the Nile's water date back to the late 19th century when Britain, which controlled Egypt and Sudan, signed deals with other colonial powers and with Ethiopia to guarantee the river's unimpeded flow. But, in 1929, a bilateral treaty went further. Egypt, which by then enjoyed nominal independence, and Britain, acting on behalf of Sudan and its other colonies around Lake Victoria, signed an agreement on water rights. It reserved the entire dry season flow of the Nile for Egypt and allowed Cairo to veto any water development project in the Nile basin .
In 1959, Egypt and the newly independent Sudan signed a deal that gave them "full utilisation of the Nile waters". Using the river's annual average flow of 84bn cubic metres of water, it was agreed that Egypt had the right to use 55.5bn cubic metres a year, with Sudan's share at 18.5bn cubic metres. The other 10bn cubic metres was reserved for seepage losses and evaporation in Lake Nasser, behind the Aswan dam. Upstream countries were not allocated a share.
Message to Medrek: Boycott parliament
By Eskinder Nega
Barely a month after the nonsensical 99 % “win” by the EPRDF in this year’s election, gloom has set in stalwartly even in the midst of EPRDF’s happy-go-lucky adherents. The extremist’s dependably silly proclivity for melodrama is also considerably diminished. (EPRDF extremists constitute an amorphous entity unofficially steered by Bereket Simon.) And with federal police and kebele officials shamefully avoiding eye contact with Addis residents, the distressing impact of the election’s “results” seem to be more perceptible on EPRDF’s grassroots than either the opposition or the general public. “This is the first election that has delegitimized the EPRDF in the eyes of its grassroots members,” says a pundit. “No one is really trying to defend it. This is a significant and unforeseen development.” And with Ambassadorships around the world, as opposed to cabinet positions, transformed in to the most coveted postings for senior government and party leaders, the potency of the EPRDF, as many of its critics keenly contend with increasing intensity, seem to be no more the eternal disarray of opposition groups. Alas, the morale of the opposition is in no superior standing; but at least they affably concede to that much. But the election “result” has triggered the underlying covet for change within the public—as many in the EPRDF feared and many in the opposition had yearned.
Take the case of Assefa, a high school teacher in Addis. In his mid-30s, married and with one child, he struggles to support his family in a city ravaged by years of double-digit inflation. He voted for CUD in 2005, his first vote in his lifetime. “I really thought they were going to win,” he says glumly. He settled on looking fretfully from the sidelines this year, convinced that the weakened opposition had no chance against the might (“for rigging,” he says) of the EPRDF. But as he sat in front of his 14-inch color TV a day after Election Day and listened to “the sweeping wins by the EPRDF”, regret about his failure to vote overwhelmed him. “It would have personalized the insult," he says, perhaps echoing the sentiment of millions of voters who feel that their individual votes that have been squandered. What should the opposition do, I ask him. “They ought to call a rally,’ he answers. But he envisages less people turning out than in 2005, when record number of people came out to shore up the opposition at Meskel square. “But more people will show up than the tens of thousands that turned out for the EPRDF last month,” he added emphatically. And his thoughts on what Medrek should do with its one seat in parliament? “They must boycott parliament. Most of my colleagues and friends feel the same way.” He was -- and still is -- against a similar decision by the CUD in 2005, arguing that the gains were too significant historically to be nonchalantly cast aside.
But Girma Seifu, who won the opposition’s only seat in Merkato, hub of anti-EPRDF emotion and Addis’ business nucleus, has dismissed the prospect of a boycott in rather harsh words. “Our party’s commitment to engage the political process is not contingent on the number of seats won,” he said to local media. “The people who pushed us towards parliamentary boycott in 2005 are responsible for the subsequent mayhem that damaged our party. My joining parliament is not subject to negotiation.” But Dr Negaso Gidada refused to rule out a boycott. “It’s up to the party to decide,” he said prudently. Girma went on to relent a bit in due course, no doubt tempered by the chilly reaction of party activists, and now insists that he will join parliament only if the amount of time allotted to him to speak is reasonable.
Fired with the intriguing possibility of parliamentary boycott, I pursued the idea with scores of Addis residents. Ahmed, a 21-year-old college student who aspires to be a politician someday, cast his first vote for Medrek this year. “I did it for Birtukan,” he says. There was some talk of protests on campus after the results were announced, he said. But the pressure of the approaching exams prevailed. Would he support a parliamentary boycott by Mederk? He is not sure. But with startling sophistication he explores both possibilities with me. And finally, he settles on boycott. “A complete absence of the opposition best highlights the narrowed political space,” he reasoned. Promising to discuss it further with his friends, he leaves somewhat energized by our chat. Three days later he calls: “Boycott wins. It’s 5 to 2.”
The enthusiasm for joining parliament amongst the youth is appreciably lower in Merkato, with many still speaking heatedly of the post election riots in 2005. “My child is not only dead, but he has been called a bank robber by the government,” said one mother I met in her one room home in Merkato, tears swelling in her eyes. “God will not take me before I see the day his name cleared.” The two young men who arranged the meeting nodded solemnly. Shocked by her unyielding trauma almost five years after the death of her child, I left hastily without asking the questions I had gone to ask. Both young men were in 10th grade in 2005, too young to vote. One voted this year. “I told him it was a complete waste of time,” said the one who did not vote as we sipped coffee in a neighborhood café. But both agreed that Medrek should boycott parliament when I raised the issue with them. “What could they do with one vote?” they ask.
A medical doctor who voted for Medrek is bolder: “Being part of a deceit will make an accomplice out of them.” But what should take precedence, I ask him: the conscience of Girma or the decision of the party, if Medrek is to settle on boycott but Girma remains unconvinced and still believes otherwise. For the liberal democrat conscience has precedence, he responds musingly. “Only for authoritarians is the party line more important than the conscience of the individual.”
But the issue Girma has to grapple with is much more complex than mere choice between conscience and the party line - if it comes to that eventuality. Indeed, his jibe at the leaders of CUD who were strong proponents of a boycott in 2005 reveal of a perception of politics as -- in line with a popular dictum -- “an art of the possible”, change coming only incrementally. The rival notion of politics, which tender stirring political parties and leaders as catalysts to overcome tyranny, is discredited as far as he is concerned. But no less significantly, this is his rendezvous with destiny. He has been abruptly catapulted from political obscurity. The next five years offer him an opportunity to construct a distinctive political identity for himself. This opening will not come again. Such thoughts will dominate his thinking in the coming months, and in fairness, particularly by the dismal moral standard of our times, one can only empathize with the impasse he will be entangled in if his personal interests collide with that of the party.
Medrek’s interest, on the other hand, is crystal clear. Clearly the majority of its supporters I spoke to want it to boycott parliament. Granted that this is no scientific survey and that serious political parties do not always accede to public opinion, the alternative is no more than the legitimatization of the status-quo and the continued momentum of a one-party state in the making. A viable opposition in the context of Ethiopia’s objective condition can not limit itself to mere electoral engagement, as is the case in normal democracies. It must out of necessity become an object of peaceful societal transformation, an agent of peaceful change. To be such a party, Medrek must boycott the parliament.
Barely a month after the nonsensical 99 % “win” by the EPRDF in this year’s election, gloom has set in stalwartly even in the midst of EPRDF’s happy-go-lucky adherents. The extremist’s dependably silly proclivity for melodrama is also considerably diminished. (EPRDF extremists constitute an amorphous entity unofficially steered by Bereket Simon.) And with federal police and kebele officials shamefully avoiding eye contact with Addis residents, the distressing impact of the election’s “results” seem to be more perceptible on EPRDF’s grassroots than either the opposition or the general public. “This is the first election that has delegitimized the EPRDF in the eyes of its grassroots members,” says a pundit. “No one is really trying to defend it. This is a significant and unforeseen development.” And with Ambassadorships around the world, as opposed to cabinet positions, transformed in to the most coveted postings for senior government and party leaders, the potency of the EPRDF, as many of its critics keenly contend with increasing intensity, seem to be no more the eternal disarray of opposition groups. Alas, the morale of the opposition is in no superior standing; but at least they affably concede to that much. But the election “result” has triggered the underlying covet for change within the public—as many in the EPRDF feared and many in the opposition had yearned.
Take the case of Assefa, a high school teacher in Addis. In his mid-30s, married and with one child, he struggles to support his family in a city ravaged by years of double-digit inflation. He voted for CUD in 2005, his first vote in his lifetime. “I really thought they were going to win,” he says glumly. He settled on looking fretfully from the sidelines this year, convinced that the weakened opposition had no chance against the might (“for rigging,” he says) of the EPRDF. But as he sat in front of his 14-inch color TV a day after Election Day and listened to “the sweeping wins by the EPRDF”, regret about his failure to vote overwhelmed him. “It would have personalized the insult," he says, perhaps echoing the sentiment of millions of voters who feel that their individual votes that have been squandered. What should the opposition do, I ask him. “They ought to call a rally,’ he answers. But he envisages less people turning out than in 2005, when record number of people came out to shore up the opposition at Meskel square. “But more people will show up than the tens of thousands that turned out for the EPRDF last month,” he added emphatically. And his thoughts on what Medrek should do with its one seat in parliament? “They must boycott parliament. Most of my colleagues and friends feel the same way.” He was -- and still is -- against a similar decision by the CUD in 2005, arguing that the gains were too significant historically to be nonchalantly cast aside.
But Girma Seifu, who won the opposition’s only seat in Merkato, hub of anti-EPRDF emotion and Addis’ business nucleus, has dismissed the prospect of a boycott in rather harsh words. “Our party’s commitment to engage the political process is not contingent on the number of seats won,” he said to local media. “The people who pushed us towards parliamentary boycott in 2005 are responsible for the subsequent mayhem that damaged our party. My joining parliament is not subject to negotiation.” But Dr Negaso Gidada refused to rule out a boycott. “It’s up to the party to decide,” he said prudently. Girma went on to relent a bit in due course, no doubt tempered by the chilly reaction of party activists, and now insists that he will join parliament only if the amount of time allotted to him to speak is reasonable.
Fired with the intriguing possibility of parliamentary boycott, I pursued the idea with scores of Addis residents. Ahmed, a 21-year-old college student who aspires to be a politician someday, cast his first vote for Medrek this year. “I did it for Birtukan,” he says. There was some talk of protests on campus after the results were announced, he said. But the pressure of the approaching exams prevailed. Would he support a parliamentary boycott by Mederk? He is not sure. But with startling sophistication he explores both possibilities with me. And finally, he settles on boycott. “A complete absence of the opposition best highlights the narrowed political space,” he reasoned. Promising to discuss it further with his friends, he leaves somewhat energized by our chat. Three days later he calls: “Boycott wins. It’s 5 to 2.”
The enthusiasm for joining parliament amongst the youth is appreciably lower in Merkato, with many still speaking heatedly of the post election riots in 2005. “My child is not only dead, but he has been called a bank robber by the government,” said one mother I met in her one room home in Merkato, tears swelling in her eyes. “God will not take me before I see the day his name cleared.” The two young men who arranged the meeting nodded solemnly. Shocked by her unyielding trauma almost five years after the death of her child, I left hastily without asking the questions I had gone to ask. Both young men were in 10th grade in 2005, too young to vote. One voted this year. “I told him it was a complete waste of time,” said the one who did not vote as we sipped coffee in a neighborhood café. But both agreed that Medrek should boycott parliament when I raised the issue with them. “What could they do with one vote?” they ask.
A medical doctor who voted for Medrek is bolder: “Being part of a deceit will make an accomplice out of them.” But what should take precedence, I ask him: the conscience of Girma or the decision of the party, if Medrek is to settle on boycott but Girma remains unconvinced and still believes otherwise. For the liberal democrat conscience has precedence, he responds musingly. “Only for authoritarians is the party line more important than the conscience of the individual.”
But the issue Girma has to grapple with is much more complex than mere choice between conscience and the party line - if it comes to that eventuality. Indeed, his jibe at the leaders of CUD who were strong proponents of a boycott in 2005 reveal of a perception of politics as -- in line with a popular dictum -- “an art of the possible”, change coming only incrementally. The rival notion of politics, which tender stirring political parties and leaders as catalysts to overcome tyranny, is discredited as far as he is concerned. But no less significantly, this is his rendezvous with destiny. He has been abruptly catapulted from political obscurity. The next five years offer him an opportunity to construct a distinctive political identity for himself. This opening will not come again. Such thoughts will dominate his thinking in the coming months, and in fairness, particularly by the dismal moral standard of our times, one can only empathize with the impasse he will be entangled in if his personal interests collide with that of the party.
Medrek’s interest, on the other hand, is crystal clear. Clearly the majority of its supporters I spoke to want it to boycott parliament. Granted that this is no scientific survey and that serious political parties do not always accede to public opinion, the alternative is no more than the legitimatization of the status-quo and the continued momentum of a one-party state in the making. A viable opposition in the context of Ethiopia’s objective condition can not limit itself to mere electoral engagement, as is the case in normal democracies. It must out of necessity become an object of peaceful societal transformation, an agent of peaceful change. To be such a party, Medrek must boycott the parliament.
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
Speaking the truth to the truth seekers
By Alemayehu G. Mariam
This is my third commentary on the theme, "Where do we go from here?", following the rigged elections in Ethiopia last month.1 In this piece, I urge Ethiopian intellectuals to exchange their armchairs for the public benches and leave their comfort zones of passivity and silence to become advocates of peaceful change and democracy in their homeland.
Where Have the Ethiopian Intellectuals Gone?
The Greek philosopher Diogenes used to walk the streets of ancient Athens carrying a lamp in broad daylight. When amused bystanders asked him about his apparently strange behavior, he would tell them that he was looking for an honest man. Like Diogenes, one may be tempted to walk the hallowed grounds of Western academia, search the cloistered spaces of the arts and scientific professions worldwide and even traverse the untamed frontiers of cyberspace with torchlight in hand looking for Ethiopian intellectuals.
Intellectuals -- a term I use rather loosely and inclusively here to describe the disparate group of Ethiopian academics, writers, artists, lawyers, journalists, physicians, philosophers, social and political thinkers and others -- often become facilitators of change by analyzing and proposing solution to complex problems and issues facing their societies. Their stock-in-trade are questions, endless questions about what is possible and how the impossible could be made possible. There are engaged and disengaged intellectuals. Those engaged are always asking questions about their societies, pointing out failures and improving on successes, suggesting solutions, examining institutions, enlightening the public, criticizing outdated and ineffective ideas and proposing new ones while articulating a vision of the future with clarity of thought. They are always on the cutting edge of social change.
The purpose of this commentary is not to moralize about the "failure of Ethiopian intellectuals", or to criticize them for things they have done, not done, undone or should have done. The purpose is to begin public discussion that will make it possible to find ways of making them a powerful force of peaceful change in Ethiopia. I make no attempt here to conceal my agenda with the Ethiopian intellectual community; in fact, I proudly proclaim it. I believe Ethiopian intellectuals have a moral obligation not to turn a blind eye to the government wrongs in their homeland, and an affirmative duty to act in the defense of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. I see many of them religiously practicing self-censorship and self-marginalization. I would like to see them enter the public arena and take on the issues. I see an artificial deficit in the supply of transformational and visionary Ethiopian thinkers, with revolutionary ideas to re-invent Ethiopian society. Such thinkers are out there but have chosen to remain disengaged. I would like to see them engaged more. At this critical time in Ethiopia's history, I believe Ethiopian intellectuals must take a leading and active role in the public debate to shape the future of their homeland. I am unapologetic in demanding their intense involvement in teaching, inspiring and preparing Ethiopia's youth within and outside the country to build a fair and just society and forge a united Ethiopian nation. I always pray that Ethiopian intellectuals will never become "whores" to dictators as the distinguished Ghanaian economist George Ayittey has warned of African intellectuals in general.
As a member of the Ethiopian "intelligentsia" and now its humble critic, I do not want to sound "holier-than-thou". I will admit that I am just as guilty as any other for the sins of commission or omission I ascribe to others. Truth be told, I was just as invisible and silent on the issues in Ethiopia as those with whom I plead here until dictator Meles Zenawi slaughtered 196 unarmed demonstrators, and shot and wounded nearly 800 more in the streets after the 2005 election in Ethiopia. That act of total depravity, cold-blooded barbarity and savagery, vicious inhumanity and pure evil was a pivotal point in my own transformation from a complacent armchair academic to an impassioned grassroots human rights advocate, as the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 in which apartheid policemen opened fire on a crowd of unarmed black protesters killing 69 was a transformational event in the lives of so many South Africans
Role of Intellectuals in Africa
An old Jewish saying teaches that "A nation's treasure is its scholars (intellectuals)." Unfortunately, in Africa that "treasure" has taken a decidedly loathsome character. Well over a decade ago, George Ayittey, the distinguished Ghanaian economist, and arguably one of the "Top 100 Public Intellectuals" worldwide who "are shaping the tenor of our time", likened African intellectuals to "hordes of prostitutes."2
Time and time again, despite repeated warnings, highly "educated" African intellectuals throw caution and common sense to the winds and fiercely jostle one another for the chance to hop into bed with military brutes. The allure of a luxury car, a diplomatic or ministerial post and a government mansion often proves too irresistible...
So hordes of politicians, lecturers, professionals, lawyers, and doctors sell themselves off into prostitution and voluntary bondage to serve the dictates of military vagabonds with half their intelligence. And time and time again, after being raped, abused, and defiled, they are tossed out like rubbish --- or worse. Yet more intellectual prostitutes stampede to take their places....
Vile opportunism, unflappable sycophancy, and trenchant collaboration on the part of Africa's intellectuals allowed tyranny to become entrenched in Africa. Doe, Mengistu, Mobutu, and other military dictators legitimized and perpetuated their rule by buying off and co-opting Africa's academics for a pittance. And when they fall out of favor, they are beaten up, tossed aside or worse. And yet more offer themselves up.
The Crises of Ethiopian Intellectuals
Perhaps Prof. Ayittey takes poetic license in his analogies to provoke serious debate over the role of intellectuals in Africa. I much prefer to think of Ethiopian intellectuals as their country's "eyes" in the sense of the American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson: "The office of the scholar (intellectual) is to cheer, to raise, and to guide men by showing them facts amid appearances. He plies the slow, unhonored, and unpaid task of observation. He is the world's eye." Though I will not challenge the fact that some Ethiopian intellectuals have "sold themselves off into prostitution and voluntary bondage", I do not believe that the vast majority of them are the wretched members of the world's oldest profession ready to "hop" in bed with the dictators lording over Ethiopia. I do believe, however, that many of us in the Ethiopian intellectual community could be fairly accused of turning a blind eye to the injustices in our homeland, not having a vision for our people and walking with blinders on so as to avoid making eye contact with the unpleasant facts of the current dictatorship in Ethiopia.
Many of us in the Ethiopian intellectual community have lost our "eye" sights because we are in crises. Some of us are mired in a moral crisis of knowing what is right but being afraid to do the right thing, and ultimately doing nothing. When Zenawi massacred hundreds of unarmed protesters and jailed tens of thousands more, few of us stood up to publicly protest. When elections are stolen in broad daylight and the country sold in bits and pieces and given away, far too many of us stood by in silent indifference. It seems many of us have developed titanium-clad consciences to keep out the reality of corruption and brutality of the dictatorship in Ethiopia.
Some of us suffer a crisis of critical thinking. We are quick to make conclusions based on hunches and speculations than rigorous analysis based on facts. We are given more to polemics and labeling than evidence-based analysis. We rarely examine and re-examine our assumptions and beliefs but cling to them as eternal truths and propagate them as such. It is embarrassing to admit that the rigorous intellectual challenge to Zenawi's neatly packaged lies has come not from Ethiopian intellectuals but from the empirical research and analysis of foreign social scientists, researchers, journalists and human rights organizations. By failing to take a rigorous approach to the study and analysis of the myriad issues in Ethiopia, we have made it possible for Ethiopia's dictators to write a gospel of lies and erect monuments to celebrate the living lies of non-existent accomplishments.
In one form or another, many of us in the Ethiopian intellectual community suffer a crisis of self-confidence and a deficit of intellectual courage. We criticize and castigate the dictatorship in private but are afraid to repeat our strongly-held views in public. Even in the Diaspora, some of us feel compelled to use pen names to express our opinions in the blogosphere. We would like others to admire us and accept and act on our ideas while we hide our real identities behind aliases and fictitious names. Many of us are afraid to make our views known because we fear the ridicule and ostracism of our associates and peers. We are afraid to take ownership and responsibility for our ideas for fear of being proven wrong and mask our intellectual cowardice with meaningless dogmas and abstractions. Lacking self-confidence, many of us have resolved to live out our lives quietly and anonymously on remote islands of self-censorship and self-marginalization.
Most of us also suffer from a crisis of foresight. We can argue the past and criticize the present, but we do very little forward-thinking. As Ethiopia's "eyes", we are ironically afflicted by myopia (nearsightedness). We can see things in the present with reasonable clarity, but we lack the vision to see things in the distance. We can see the potential problems of ethnicity in Ethiopia, but we are blinded to its solutions in the future. We see the country being dismembered in pieces but lack the vision to make it whole in the future. We can see ethnic animosity simmering under the surface, but we have been unable to help create a new national consciousness to overcome it. We can articulate a present plan for accession to political power but we lack the foresight and contingency planning necessary to ensure democratic governance.
We have a serious crisis of communication. Many of us talk past each other and lack intellectual honesty and candor in our communications. We pretend to agree and give lip service to each other only to turn around and engage in vile backbiting. We speak to each other and the general public in ambiguities and "tongues". Often we do not say what we mean or mean what we say. We keep each other guessing. We do not listen to each other well, and make precious little effort to genuinely seek common ground with those who do not agree with us. We have a nasty habit of marginalizing those who disagree with us and tell it like it is. We hate to admit error and apologize. Instead we compound mistakes by committing more errors. We tend to be overly critical of each other over non-essentials. As a result, we have failed to nurture coherent and dynamic intellectual discourse about Ethiopia's present and future.
We have a crisis of intellectual leadership. There are few identifiable Ethiopian intellectual leaders today. In many societies, a diverse and competing intellectual community functions as the tip of the spear of social change. In the past two decades, we have seen the powerful role played by intellectual leaders in emancipating Eastern Europe from the clutches of communist tyranny and in leading a peaceful process of change. No society can ever aspire to advance without a core intellectual guiding force. The founders of the American Republic were not merely political leaders but also intellectuals of the highest caliber for any age. They harnessed their collective intellectual energies to forge a nation for themselves and their posterity. Their conception of government and constitution has become a template for every country that aspires for the blessings of liberty and democracy. Despite some major shortcomings, the Americans got it right because their founders were visionary intellectuals.
Ethiopian Intellectuals Through Zenawi's Eyes
Zenawi regards himself to be an intellectual par excellence based on the available fragmentary corpus of his written work, numerous public statements and anecdotal narratives of those who have interacted with him. In August 2009, the Economist magazine described him as silver-tongued conversationalist with a "sharp mind, elephantine memory and ability to speak for two hours without notes. With his polished English, full of arcane turns of phrase from his days at a private English school in Addis Ababa, the capital, he captivates foreign donors." Jeffrey Sachs, the celebrated shaman of Western aid to Africa and Columbia University professor, often patronizes Zenawi for his "intellect" and "vision". (In January 2008, Sachs expressed euphoric fascination over "Ethiopia's 11 or 12 percent economic development year after year [which makes] people say oh...what's going on there?" under Zenawi's leadership. Zenawi is said to be an assiduous autodidact. He reputedly harbors much distaste and contempt for the Ethiopian intellectual community in much the same way he does for his political opposition. His attitude is that he can outwit, outthink, outsmart, outplay, outfox and outmaneuver boatloads of Ph.Ds., M.Ds., J.Ds. Ed.Ds or whatever alphabet soup of degrees exist out there any day of the week. He seems to think that like the opposition leaders, Ethiopian intellectuals are dysfunctional, shiftless and inconsequential, and will never be able to pose a real challenge to his power.
Regardless of the merits of Zenawi's purported views, the fact of the matter is that few Ethiopian intellectuals have bothered to scrutinize his ideas or record in a systematic and rigorous manner. When he made manifestly false and outrageous claims of "economic growth" and "development", few Ethiopian economists challenged him on the facts. It took foreign scholars, researchers and journalists to undertake an investigation to expose Zenawi's fraudulent claims of success in health, education and social welfare programs. Few Ethiopian historians, political scientists, sociologists and others have come forward to challenge his bizarre theory of "ethnic federalism". Nor have there been any rigorous analyses of the slogan of "revolutionary democracy" palmed off as a coherent political theory. Few Ethiopian lawyers have examined his constitution and demonstrated his flagrant violation of it. Given these facts, all that can be said in defense of Ethiopian intellectuals is: "If the shoe fits, wear it!"
The Challenge: Becoming Public Intellectuals
The challenge to Ethiopian intellectuals is to find ways of transforming themselves into "public intellectuals." In other words, regardless of our formal training in a particular discipline, we should strive to engage the broader Ethiopian society beyond our narrow professional concerns through our writings and advocacy efforts. We should strive for something far larger than our disciplines, and by speaking truth to power metamorphosise into "public intellectuals." Here are a few ideas for this enterprise:
Get involved. I hear all sorts of excuses from Ethiopian intellectuals for not getting involved. The most common one is: "I am a 'scholar', a 'scientist', etc., and do not want to get involved in politics." Albert Einstein was not only one of the most influential and best known scientists and intellectuals of all time, he was also a relentless and passionate advocate for pacifism and the plight of German-Jewish refugees. Others plead futility. "Nothing I do could ever make a difference because Ethiopia's problems are too many and too complex." The answer is found in an Ethiopian proverb: "Enough strands of the spiders' web could tie up a lion." Let each one do his/her part, and cumulatively the difference made will be enormous.
Articulate a Vision. Ethiopian intellectuals need to articulate a vision for their people. It is ironic to be the "eyes" of a nation and be visionless at the same time. What are our dreams, hopes and aspirations for Ethiopia? What are the values we should be collectively striving for? Why are we not able to come up with an intellectual framework that can provide a bulwark against tyranny, and restore good governance to a nation of powerless masses and broken institutions? As the old saying goes, "If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there."
Create and Maintain a Think Tank. Think tanks are "policy actors in democratic societies assuring a pluralistic, open and accountable process of policy analysis, research, decision-making and evaluation." There are thousands of them worldwide. It is necessary to establish such organizations for Ethiopia to conduct research and engage in advocacy and public education. On various occasions, I have publicly called for the establishment of an informal policy "think tank" to research and critically evaluate current and emergent issues in Ethiopia. Would it not be wonderful if there could be union of concerned Ethiopian scholars, scientists, intellectuals and professionals who could come together as the tip of the spear in seeking to institutionalize democracy, human rights and rule of law in Ethiopia?
Create a Legal Defense Fund. Frequently, I am asked why Ethiopian lawyers do not get together and from a legal action group to study and litigate human rights issues. Wherever I give a speech, I am always asked the question about why "you Ethiopian lawyers are not doing something about human rights, political prisoners, violations of international law....in Ethiopia? There are many examples in the U.S. of global campaigns for human rights undertaken by groups of dedicated lawyers supported by dozens of cooperating attorneys across the country. Ethiopian lawyers need to step up to the plate.
Establish Expert Panels. We have few experts available to serve as resources on issues affecting Ethiopia. Many Ethiopian experts are unwilling to come forward and give interviews to the media or to offer testimony in official proceedings. We need a roster of experts to represent Ethiopia on the world stage.
Teach the People. Zenawi often claims that Ethiopian intellectuals, particularly in the West, do not really understand the situation in the country and are merely speculating about conditions. He says our notions of democracy based on Western models are fanciful, desultory and inappropriate for Ethiopia and an "ethnic basis of Ethiopia's democracy [is necessary] to fight against poverty and the need for an equitable distribution of the nation s wealth: peasants must be enabled to make their own decisions in terms of their own culture. Power must be devolved to them in ways that they understand, and they understand ethnicity...." It our role as intellectuals to discredit such manifestly nonsensical political theory by teaching the people the true meaning of democracy based on popular consent. We must teach the Ethiopian people that it is a travesty and a mockery of democracy for one man and one party to remain in power for 25 years and call that a democracy. We must find ways to empower the people by teaching them.
Act in Solidarity With the Oppressed
As intellectuals, we are often disconnected from the reality of ordinary life just like the dictators who live in a bubble. But we will remain on the right track if we follow Gandhi's teaching: "Recall the face of the poorest and the most helpless man you have seen and ask yourself whether the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him. Will he be able to gain anything by it? Will it restore to him a control over his own life and destiny? In other words, will it lead to Swaraj (independence) or self-rule for the hungry and spiritually starved millions of your countrymen? Then you will find your doubts and yourself melting away." Let us always ask ourselves if what we do and whether our actions will help restore to the poorest and most helpless Ethiopians a control over their own life and destiny.
As I point an index finger at others, I am painfully aware that three fingers are pointing at me. So be it. I believe I know "where all the Ethiopian intellectuals have gone." Most of them are standing silently with eyes wide shut in every corner of the globe. But wherever they may be, I hasten to warn them that they will eventually have to face the "Ayittey Dilemma" alone: Choose to stand up for Ethiopia, or lie down with the dictators who rape, abuse and defile her.
1http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/
2 http://www.freeafrica.org/articles/africaselites/NoTearsForAfricasIntellectualProstitutes.html
This is my third commentary on the theme, "Where do we go from here?", following the rigged elections in Ethiopia last month.1 In this piece, I urge Ethiopian intellectuals to exchange their armchairs for the public benches and leave their comfort zones of passivity and silence to become advocates of peaceful change and democracy in their homeland.
Where Have the Ethiopian Intellectuals Gone?
The Greek philosopher Diogenes used to walk the streets of ancient Athens carrying a lamp in broad daylight. When amused bystanders asked him about his apparently strange behavior, he would tell them that he was looking for an honest man. Like Diogenes, one may be tempted to walk the hallowed grounds of Western academia, search the cloistered spaces of the arts and scientific professions worldwide and even traverse the untamed frontiers of cyberspace with torchlight in hand looking for Ethiopian intellectuals.
Intellectuals -- a term I use rather loosely and inclusively here to describe the disparate group of Ethiopian academics, writers, artists, lawyers, journalists, physicians, philosophers, social and political thinkers and others -- often become facilitators of change by analyzing and proposing solution to complex problems and issues facing their societies. Their stock-in-trade are questions, endless questions about what is possible and how the impossible could be made possible. There are engaged and disengaged intellectuals. Those engaged are always asking questions about their societies, pointing out failures and improving on successes, suggesting solutions, examining institutions, enlightening the public, criticizing outdated and ineffective ideas and proposing new ones while articulating a vision of the future with clarity of thought. They are always on the cutting edge of social change.
The purpose of this commentary is not to moralize about the "failure of Ethiopian intellectuals", or to criticize them for things they have done, not done, undone or should have done. The purpose is to begin public discussion that will make it possible to find ways of making them a powerful force of peaceful change in Ethiopia. I make no attempt here to conceal my agenda with the Ethiopian intellectual community; in fact, I proudly proclaim it. I believe Ethiopian intellectuals have a moral obligation not to turn a blind eye to the government wrongs in their homeland, and an affirmative duty to act in the defense of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. I see many of them religiously practicing self-censorship and self-marginalization. I would like to see them enter the public arena and take on the issues. I see an artificial deficit in the supply of transformational and visionary Ethiopian thinkers, with revolutionary ideas to re-invent Ethiopian society. Such thinkers are out there but have chosen to remain disengaged. I would like to see them engaged more. At this critical time in Ethiopia's history, I believe Ethiopian intellectuals must take a leading and active role in the public debate to shape the future of their homeland. I am unapologetic in demanding their intense involvement in teaching, inspiring and preparing Ethiopia's youth within and outside the country to build a fair and just society and forge a united Ethiopian nation. I always pray that Ethiopian intellectuals will never become "whores" to dictators as the distinguished Ghanaian economist George Ayittey has warned of African intellectuals in general.
As a member of the Ethiopian "intelligentsia" and now its humble critic, I do not want to sound "holier-than-thou". I will admit that I am just as guilty as any other for the sins of commission or omission I ascribe to others. Truth be told, I was just as invisible and silent on the issues in Ethiopia as those with whom I plead here until dictator Meles Zenawi slaughtered 196 unarmed demonstrators, and shot and wounded nearly 800 more in the streets after the 2005 election in Ethiopia. That act of total depravity, cold-blooded barbarity and savagery, vicious inhumanity and pure evil was a pivotal point in my own transformation from a complacent armchair academic to an impassioned grassroots human rights advocate, as the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 in which apartheid policemen opened fire on a crowd of unarmed black protesters killing 69 was a transformational event in the lives of so many South Africans
Role of Intellectuals in Africa
An old Jewish saying teaches that "A nation's treasure is its scholars (intellectuals)." Unfortunately, in Africa that "treasure" has taken a decidedly loathsome character. Well over a decade ago, George Ayittey, the distinguished Ghanaian economist, and arguably one of the "Top 100 Public Intellectuals" worldwide who "are shaping the tenor of our time", likened African intellectuals to "hordes of prostitutes."2
Time and time again, despite repeated warnings, highly "educated" African intellectuals throw caution and common sense to the winds and fiercely jostle one another for the chance to hop into bed with military brutes. The allure of a luxury car, a diplomatic or ministerial post and a government mansion often proves too irresistible...
So hordes of politicians, lecturers, professionals, lawyers, and doctors sell themselves off into prostitution and voluntary bondage to serve the dictates of military vagabonds with half their intelligence. And time and time again, after being raped, abused, and defiled, they are tossed out like rubbish --- or worse. Yet more intellectual prostitutes stampede to take their places....
Vile opportunism, unflappable sycophancy, and trenchant collaboration on the part of Africa's intellectuals allowed tyranny to become entrenched in Africa. Doe, Mengistu, Mobutu, and other military dictators legitimized and perpetuated their rule by buying off and co-opting Africa's academics for a pittance. And when they fall out of favor, they are beaten up, tossed aside or worse. And yet more offer themselves up.
The Crises of Ethiopian Intellectuals
Perhaps Prof. Ayittey takes poetic license in his analogies to provoke serious debate over the role of intellectuals in Africa. I much prefer to think of Ethiopian intellectuals as their country's "eyes" in the sense of the American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson: "The office of the scholar (intellectual) is to cheer, to raise, and to guide men by showing them facts amid appearances. He plies the slow, unhonored, and unpaid task of observation. He is the world's eye." Though I will not challenge the fact that some Ethiopian intellectuals have "sold themselves off into prostitution and voluntary bondage", I do not believe that the vast majority of them are the wretched members of the world's oldest profession ready to "hop" in bed with the dictators lording over Ethiopia. I do believe, however, that many of us in the Ethiopian intellectual community could be fairly accused of turning a blind eye to the injustices in our homeland, not having a vision for our people and walking with blinders on so as to avoid making eye contact with the unpleasant facts of the current dictatorship in Ethiopia.
Many of us in the Ethiopian intellectual community have lost our "eye" sights because we are in crises. Some of us are mired in a moral crisis of knowing what is right but being afraid to do the right thing, and ultimately doing nothing. When Zenawi massacred hundreds of unarmed protesters and jailed tens of thousands more, few of us stood up to publicly protest. When elections are stolen in broad daylight and the country sold in bits and pieces and given away, far too many of us stood by in silent indifference. It seems many of us have developed titanium-clad consciences to keep out the reality of corruption and brutality of the dictatorship in Ethiopia.
Some of us suffer a crisis of critical thinking. We are quick to make conclusions based on hunches and speculations than rigorous analysis based on facts. We are given more to polemics and labeling than evidence-based analysis. We rarely examine and re-examine our assumptions and beliefs but cling to them as eternal truths and propagate them as such. It is embarrassing to admit that the rigorous intellectual challenge to Zenawi's neatly packaged lies has come not from Ethiopian intellectuals but from the empirical research and analysis of foreign social scientists, researchers, journalists and human rights organizations. By failing to take a rigorous approach to the study and analysis of the myriad issues in Ethiopia, we have made it possible for Ethiopia's dictators to write a gospel of lies and erect monuments to celebrate the living lies of non-existent accomplishments.
In one form or another, many of us in the Ethiopian intellectual community suffer a crisis of self-confidence and a deficit of intellectual courage. We criticize and castigate the dictatorship in private but are afraid to repeat our strongly-held views in public. Even in the Diaspora, some of us feel compelled to use pen names to express our opinions in the blogosphere. We would like others to admire us and accept and act on our ideas while we hide our real identities behind aliases and fictitious names. Many of us are afraid to make our views known because we fear the ridicule and ostracism of our associates and peers. We are afraid to take ownership and responsibility for our ideas for fear of being proven wrong and mask our intellectual cowardice with meaningless dogmas and abstractions. Lacking self-confidence, many of us have resolved to live out our lives quietly and anonymously on remote islands of self-censorship and self-marginalization.
Most of us also suffer from a crisis of foresight. We can argue the past and criticize the present, but we do very little forward-thinking. As Ethiopia's "eyes", we are ironically afflicted by myopia (nearsightedness). We can see things in the present with reasonable clarity, but we lack the vision to see things in the distance. We can see the potential problems of ethnicity in Ethiopia, but we are blinded to its solutions in the future. We see the country being dismembered in pieces but lack the vision to make it whole in the future. We can see ethnic animosity simmering under the surface, but we have been unable to help create a new national consciousness to overcome it. We can articulate a present plan for accession to political power but we lack the foresight and contingency planning necessary to ensure democratic governance.
We have a serious crisis of communication. Many of us talk past each other and lack intellectual honesty and candor in our communications. We pretend to agree and give lip service to each other only to turn around and engage in vile backbiting. We speak to each other and the general public in ambiguities and "tongues". Often we do not say what we mean or mean what we say. We keep each other guessing. We do not listen to each other well, and make precious little effort to genuinely seek common ground with those who do not agree with us. We have a nasty habit of marginalizing those who disagree with us and tell it like it is. We hate to admit error and apologize. Instead we compound mistakes by committing more errors. We tend to be overly critical of each other over non-essentials. As a result, we have failed to nurture coherent and dynamic intellectual discourse about Ethiopia's present and future.
We have a crisis of intellectual leadership. There are few identifiable Ethiopian intellectual leaders today. In many societies, a diverse and competing intellectual community functions as the tip of the spear of social change. In the past two decades, we have seen the powerful role played by intellectual leaders in emancipating Eastern Europe from the clutches of communist tyranny and in leading a peaceful process of change. No society can ever aspire to advance without a core intellectual guiding force. The founders of the American Republic were not merely political leaders but also intellectuals of the highest caliber for any age. They harnessed their collective intellectual energies to forge a nation for themselves and their posterity. Their conception of government and constitution has become a template for every country that aspires for the blessings of liberty and democracy. Despite some major shortcomings, the Americans got it right because their founders were visionary intellectuals.
Ethiopian Intellectuals Through Zenawi's Eyes
Zenawi regards himself to be an intellectual par excellence based on the available fragmentary corpus of his written work, numerous public statements and anecdotal narratives of those who have interacted with him. In August 2009, the Economist magazine described him as silver-tongued conversationalist with a "sharp mind, elephantine memory and ability to speak for two hours without notes. With his polished English, full of arcane turns of phrase from his days at a private English school in Addis Ababa, the capital, he captivates foreign donors." Jeffrey Sachs, the celebrated shaman of Western aid to Africa and Columbia University professor, often patronizes Zenawi for his "intellect" and "vision". (In January 2008, Sachs expressed euphoric fascination over "Ethiopia's 11 or 12 percent economic development year after year [which makes] people say oh...what's going on there?" under Zenawi's leadership. Zenawi is said to be an assiduous autodidact. He reputedly harbors much distaste and contempt for the Ethiopian intellectual community in much the same way he does for his political opposition. His attitude is that he can outwit, outthink, outsmart, outplay, outfox and outmaneuver boatloads of Ph.Ds., M.Ds., J.Ds. Ed.Ds or whatever alphabet soup of degrees exist out there any day of the week. He seems to think that like the opposition leaders, Ethiopian intellectuals are dysfunctional, shiftless and inconsequential, and will never be able to pose a real challenge to his power.
Regardless of the merits of Zenawi's purported views, the fact of the matter is that few Ethiopian intellectuals have bothered to scrutinize his ideas or record in a systematic and rigorous manner. When he made manifestly false and outrageous claims of "economic growth" and "development", few Ethiopian economists challenged him on the facts. It took foreign scholars, researchers and journalists to undertake an investigation to expose Zenawi's fraudulent claims of success in health, education and social welfare programs. Few Ethiopian historians, political scientists, sociologists and others have come forward to challenge his bizarre theory of "ethnic federalism". Nor have there been any rigorous analyses of the slogan of "revolutionary democracy" palmed off as a coherent political theory. Few Ethiopian lawyers have examined his constitution and demonstrated his flagrant violation of it. Given these facts, all that can be said in defense of Ethiopian intellectuals is: "If the shoe fits, wear it!"
The Challenge: Becoming Public Intellectuals
The challenge to Ethiopian intellectuals is to find ways of transforming themselves into "public intellectuals." In other words, regardless of our formal training in a particular discipline, we should strive to engage the broader Ethiopian society beyond our narrow professional concerns through our writings and advocacy efforts. We should strive for something far larger than our disciplines, and by speaking truth to power metamorphosise into "public intellectuals." Here are a few ideas for this enterprise:
Get involved. I hear all sorts of excuses from Ethiopian intellectuals for not getting involved. The most common one is: "I am a 'scholar', a 'scientist', etc., and do not want to get involved in politics." Albert Einstein was not only one of the most influential and best known scientists and intellectuals of all time, he was also a relentless and passionate advocate for pacifism and the plight of German-Jewish refugees. Others plead futility. "Nothing I do could ever make a difference because Ethiopia's problems are too many and too complex." The answer is found in an Ethiopian proverb: "Enough strands of the spiders' web could tie up a lion." Let each one do his/her part, and cumulatively the difference made will be enormous.
Articulate a Vision. Ethiopian intellectuals need to articulate a vision for their people. It is ironic to be the "eyes" of a nation and be visionless at the same time. What are our dreams, hopes and aspirations for Ethiopia? What are the values we should be collectively striving for? Why are we not able to come up with an intellectual framework that can provide a bulwark against tyranny, and restore good governance to a nation of powerless masses and broken institutions? As the old saying goes, "If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there."
Create and Maintain a Think Tank. Think tanks are "policy actors in democratic societies assuring a pluralistic, open and accountable process of policy analysis, research, decision-making and evaluation." There are thousands of them worldwide. It is necessary to establish such organizations for Ethiopia to conduct research and engage in advocacy and public education. On various occasions, I have publicly called for the establishment of an informal policy "think tank" to research and critically evaluate current and emergent issues in Ethiopia. Would it not be wonderful if there could be union of concerned Ethiopian scholars, scientists, intellectuals and professionals who could come together as the tip of the spear in seeking to institutionalize democracy, human rights and rule of law in Ethiopia?
Create a Legal Defense Fund. Frequently, I am asked why Ethiopian lawyers do not get together and from a legal action group to study and litigate human rights issues. Wherever I give a speech, I am always asked the question about why "you Ethiopian lawyers are not doing something about human rights, political prisoners, violations of international law....in Ethiopia? There are many examples in the U.S. of global campaigns for human rights undertaken by groups of dedicated lawyers supported by dozens of cooperating attorneys across the country. Ethiopian lawyers need to step up to the plate.
Establish Expert Panels. We have few experts available to serve as resources on issues affecting Ethiopia. Many Ethiopian experts are unwilling to come forward and give interviews to the media or to offer testimony in official proceedings. We need a roster of experts to represent Ethiopia on the world stage.
Teach the People. Zenawi often claims that Ethiopian intellectuals, particularly in the West, do not really understand the situation in the country and are merely speculating about conditions. He says our notions of democracy based on Western models are fanciful, desultory and inappropriate for Ethiopia and an "ethnic basis of Ethiopia's democracy [is necessary] to fight against poverty and the need for an equitable distribution of the nation s wealth: peasants must be enabled to make their own decisions in terms of their own culture. Power must be devolved to them in ways that they understand, and they understand ethnicity...." It our role as intellectuals to discredit such manifestly nonsensical political theory by teaching the people the true meaning of democracy based on popular consent. We must teach the Ethiopian people that it is a travesty and a mockery of democracy for one man and one party to remain in power for 25 years and call that a democracy. We must find ways to empower the people by teaching them.
Act in Solidarity With the Oppressed
As intellectuals, we are often disconnected from the reality of ordinary life just like the dictators who live in a bubble. But we will remain on the right track if we follow Gandhi's teaching: "Recall the face of the poorest and the most helpless man you have seen and ask yourself whether the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him. Will he be able to gain anything by it? Will it restore to him a control over his own life and destiny? In other words, will it lead to Swaraj (independence) or self-rule for the hungry and spiritually starved millions of your countrymen? Then you will find your doubts and yourself melting away." Let us always ask ourselves if what we do and whether our actions will help restore to the poorest and most helpless Ethiopians a control over their own life and destiny.
As I point an index finger at others, I am painfully aware that three fingers are pointing at me. So be it. I believe I know "where all the Ethiopian intellectuals have gone." Most of them are standing silently with eyes wide shut in every corner of the globe. But wherever they may be, I hasten to warn them that they will eventually have to face the "Ayittey Dilemma" alone: Choose to stand up for Ethiopia, or lie down with the dictators who rape, abuse and defile her.
1http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/
2 http://www.freeafrica.org/articles/africaselites/NoTearsForAfricasIntellectualProstitutes.html
Government Uses “Wear-Them-Out” Tactic to Force Broadcasters Off Air
Addis Neger
Ethiopian Government uses selective jamming to tire out opposition broadcasters. This tactic is part of the strategy designed by the Bereket Simeon-led Communications Office to counter opposition propaganda offensive. It is intended to force broadcasters off air in a cost effective way, according to information obtained from ruling party insiders by Addis Neger. Ethiopia spends millions of dollars a year to jam broadcasters that the government deems are “anti-EPRDF”.
After the launch of ESAT, ruling party officials have been concerned that the opposition might step up its propaganda warfare in the next few years with the help of “foreign governments and institutions”. “The issue of foreign institutions helping Ethiopian opposition groups to launch media organizations is becoming a major concern within EPRDF,” one of our sources said. “Many officials of the party think that the analysis by western governments and institutions that the result of the May elections was partly a function of lack of independent media in Ethiopia would make them support opposition groups to start radio and TV stations as well as websites that reach Ethiopia. The party is bracing to counter what may be intense media warfare.”
EPRDF leaders think that selective, irregular jamming can “wear-out” both the opposition and their financial backers, bankrupt their media organizations and force them off air. This is the least costly of jamming efforts. Based on this tactic, the government will let some broadcasters on air sometimes but jams them unexpectedly and irregularly.
According to our sources, the government considers some Scandinavian countries, Qatar and American institutions such as George Soros’ Open Society Initiative (OSI) as the likeliest to fund opposition media organizations.
Ethiopian Government uses selective jamming to tire out opposition broadcasters. This tactic is part of the strategy designed by the Bereket Simeon-led Communications Office to counter opposition propaganda offensive. It is intended to force broadcasters off air in a cost effective way, according to information obtained from ruling party insiders by Addis Neger. Ethiopia spends millions of dollars a year to jam broadcasters that the government deems are “anti-EPRDF”.
After the launch of ESAT, ruling party officials have been concerned that the opposition might step up its propaganda warfare in the next few years with the help of “foreign governments and institutions”. “The issue of foreign institutions helping Ethiopian opposition groups to launch media organizations is becoming a major concern within EPRDF,” one of our sources said. “Many officials of the party think that the analysis by western governments and institutions that the result of the May elections was partly a function of lack of independent media in Ethiopia would make them support opposition groups to start radio and TV stations as well as websites that reach Ethiopia. The party is bracing to counter what may be intense media warfare.”
EPRDF leaders think that selective, irregular jamming can “wear-out” both the opposition and their financial backers, bankrupt their media organizations and force them off air. This is the least costly of jamming efforts. Based on this tactic, the government will let some broadcasters on air sometimes but jams them unexpectedly and irregularly.
According to our sources, the government considers some Scandinavian countries, Qatar and American institutions such as George Soros’ Open Society Initiative (OSI) as the likeliest to fund opposition media organizations.
The Worst of the Worst
Bad dude dictators and general coconut heads.
BY GEORGE B.N. AYITTEY, Foreign Policy
TONY KARUMBA/AFP/Getty Images
9. MELES ZENAWI of Ethiopia: Worse than the former Marxist dictator he ousted nearly two decades ago, Zenawi has clamped down on the opposition, stifled all dissent, and rigged elections. Like a true Marxist revolutionary, Zenawi has stashed millions in foreign banks and acquired mansions in Maryland and London in his wife's name, according to the opposition -- even as his barbaric regime collects a whopping $1 billion in foreign aid each year.
Years in power: 19
China Involved in ESAT Jamming
Addis Neger
The satellite transmission of an Ethiopian broadcaster ESAT has successfully been jammed by Ethiopia’s Information Network Security Agency(INSA). According to information obtained by Addis Neger, INSA has received material and technical assistance for the jamming from the Chinese government.
Information received by Addis Neger reveals that INSA started preparing for jamming the station two days after ESAT announced its launch date. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi ordered the agency “to do everything to stifle or limit” broadcasting by the station, which the prime minister in his letter to INSA said was owned by Brehanu Nega. Assistance was sought from the Chinese government after INSA tried local jamming equipments. In mid May, a 700MW Chinese manufactured jammer was brought to Ethiopia. It was installed at the agency’s facility which is located at the Sar Bet area. Satellite images obtained by Addis Neger show the location of the jammer.
The machine was put to use almost immediately and successfully jammed ESAT for a few days. ESAT increased its signal strength and was able to be back on air. INSA responded by increasing interference capacity, successfully jamming the station. Chinese technical assistance has been on hand throughout this process. The equipment was provided by China on a long term loan agreement.
Backed both by the US and China, INSA was established to safeguard government information systems from security threats. But it is also used to monitor e-mail communications, filter opposition websites, jam TV and radio signals and monitor wire transfers. Addis Neger learnt that in the past few months, INSA has increased its capacity for generative/non-reactive information warfare. This may involve hacking the communication of opposition party leaders and activists living overseas, according to our trusted sources.
The satellite transmission of an Ethiopian broadcaster ESAT has successfully been jammed by Ethiopia’s Information Network Security Agency(INSA). According to information obtained by Addis Neger, INSA has received material and technical assistance for the jamming from the Chinese government.
Information received by Addis Neger reveals that INSA started preparing for jamming the station two days after ESAT announced its launch date. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi ordered the agency “to do everything to stifle or limit” broadcasting by the station, which the prime minister in his letter to INSA said was owned by Brehanu Nega. Assistance was sought from the Chinese government after INSA tried local jamming equipments. In mid May, a 700MW Chinese manufactured jammer was brought to Ethiopia. It was installed at the agency’s facility which is located at the Sar Bet area. Satellite images obtained by Addis Neger show the location of the jammer.
The machine was put to use almost immediately and successfully jammed ESAT for a few days. ESAT increased its signal strength and was able to be back on air. INSA responded by increasing interference capacity, successfully jamming the station. Chinese technical assistance has been on hand throughout this process. The equipment was provided by China on a long term loan agreement.
Backed both by the US and China, INSA was established to safeguard government information systems from security threats. But it is also used to monitor e-mail communications, filter opposition websites, jam TV and radio signals and monitor wire transfers. Addis Neger learnt that in the past few months, INSA has increased its capacity for generative/non-reactive information warfare. This may involve hacking the communication of opposition party leaders and activists living overseas, according to our trusted sources.
Monday, June 21, 2010
Why democracy isn't working
By Jason McLure, Newsweek
To a casual observer, the tens of thousands of people who poured into the central square of Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa on May 25 to peacefully celebrate the country’s elections might have been mistaken for a massive symbol of democratic progress in a poor and troubled part of the world. In fact it was quite the opposite.
The demonstrators were there to denounce Human Rights Watch for criticizing the victory of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front and its allies, who claimed 545 out of 547 seats in Parliament following a massive campaign of intimidation against opposition supporters. Many of the protesters were paid the equivalent of a day’s wage for a few hours of shouting against Human Rights Watch. They were emblematic not only of Ethiopia’s return to a one-party state, 19 years after the fall of a communist regime, but also of a growing trend away from democracy in wide swaths of Africa. The trend includes not only pariah states such as Eritrea and Sudan, but key Western allies and major recipients of foreign aid such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, which offers the world’s richest prize package to African leaders who both help their countries and peacefully leave office, decided not to offer an award each of the last two years
In Rwanda, President Paul Kagame has become a darling of the West for leading an economic renaissance in a nation traumatized by the 1990s genocide. But in upcoming August elections, Kagame looks set to duplicate his implausibly high 95 percent victory in the last vote and is pressing charges against an opposition leader for “divisionism,” namely downplaying the genocide. In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni, who denounced dictatorship in Africa when he took power in 1986 and was seen as another great democratic hope, has said he’ll try to extend his 24-year tenure in presidential elections next year. In Gabon and Togo, the deaths of long-serving autocrats Omar Bongo and Gnassingbé Eyadéma has meant elections in which power was smoothly transferred—to their sons. Disastrous polls in Nigeria and Kenya in 2007 were worse than those countries’ previous elections, and current trends show little hope for improvement. Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar, and Niger have all had coups since 2008, while Guinea-Bissau has been effectively taken over by drug cartels.
Africa’s own institutions have been unable to halt the trend, which has gained speed since a period of openness following the end of the Cold War. “The democratization process on the continent is not faring very well,” says Jean Ping, the Gabonese chairman of the African Union Commission, which has overseen a host of Pan-African agreements on democracy and human rights that many member states have either ignored or failed to ratify. “The measures that we take here are taken in a bid to make sure that we move forward. The crises, they are repeating themselves.” In country after country, the recipe for the new age of authoritarianism is the same: demonization and criminal prosecution of opposition leaders, dire warnings of ethnic conflict and chaos should the ruling party be toppled, stacking of electoral commissions, and the mammoth mobilization of security forces and government resources on behalf of the party in power. “The really powerful governments learned how to do elections,” says Richard Dowden, director of the London-based Royal African Society. That’s not to say the continent doesn’t retain some bright spots. In Ghana, presidents have twice stepped down to make way for leaders from the opposition. Democracy has flourished in Botswana and Benin, while regional giant South Africa continues to have a vibrant opposition and free press despite the African National Congress’s dominance of post-apartheid politics.
But backsliders have them outnumbered, a shift that hasn’t gone unnoticed in the West. Political freedoms declined in 10 countries on the continent in 2009, while they improved in just four, according to an annual report by Washington, D.C.–based Freedom House, which dropped three African countries from its list of “electoral democracies” last year. “Repression can take many forms, and too many nations, even those that have elections, are plagued by problems that condemn their people to poverty,” President Obama told Ghana’s Parliament last year. His top diplomat for Africa, Johnnie Carson, took office last year listing the continent’s democratization as his top priority.
Yet despite the rhetoric, the Obama administration and its European allies, which spent $27 billion on African development aid in 2009, according to the OECD, have largely acquiesced to the shift away from open politics on the continent. In some cases the rise of China means oil exporters such as Nigeria and Gabon have alternative markets for their production, thus reducing Western leverage to push for political reforms. In others, the refusal to challenge autocratic regimes has been driven by security—Ugandan, Burundian, and Ethiopian troops have functioned as de facto Western proxies in battling radical Somali Islamists in Mogadishu.
“The expectation was that this administration would give greater weight to issues of democracy and governance,” says Jennifer Cooke, an Africa analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. But this tepid response to Ethiopia’s ruling party’s 99.6 percent victory and the pre-cooking of the upcoming polls in Rwanda and Uganda show the boundaries of its willingness to push key allies.
Beyond security and the scramble for resources, a third factor in the West’s acceptance of Africa’s political retrenchment is the increasing influence of aid groups like the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.K.’s Department for International Development over their countries’ foreign policies. International pressure to get closer to the U.N. goal of giving 0.7 percent of their gross national income to development has led to steadily increasing aid budgets—even if there is evidence that aid is easily manipulated by authoritarian governments to suit their own ends.
“The aid departments are saying, ‘Don’t upset the politics of these countries because we’ve got all this aid to push out,’?” says Dowden of the Royal African Society. “But I would say these states need development work because the governance is so bad. You’ve got to put the politics first.”
Take Inderaw Mohammed Siraj, a 60-year-old Ethiopian opposition candidate who lost a finger after being beaten by ruling-party cadres in 2008. Last year, he says, he was kicked out of a food-aid program funded by the U.S., the World Bank, and the European Union when a local official from his village in a remote corner of northeast Ethiopia told him: “We will not feed opposition members.”
With virtually no opposition representation in Parliament, the independent press and local human-rights groups now closed or under attack, and the prospect of his children begging for food, he has realized life would be easier if he gave up politics. “I decided to stop being part of the opposition,” he says. “The party couldn’t help me. Foreigners didn’t do anything. Democracy isn’t working here.”
But cutting aid to authoritarian states like Ethiopia means not only halting some programs that help the poor but also losing influence in the region, a move that could haunt Western policymakers in future crises. “In Pakistan we cut the ties for the military in the 1990s,” says J. Peter Pham, a professor at James Madison University who was an Africa adviser to Sen. John McCain’s 2008 presidential campaign. “As a result, today the officers coming up to flag rank weren’t trained in U.S. institutions. We don’t have their mobile-phone numbers. Our diplomats rue not having that influence.”
Similarly with the U.S. and its European allies reluctant to send their own forces to halt African crises in Darfur, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, good relations with local strongmen like Museveni, Kagame, and Meles is a must. Today’s dictators may not be as cruel as Zaire’s Mobutu or other Cold War despots, nor Western aid so overt. But the strategy of backing nasty allies to influence events in a tough part of the world remains the same. That just means Obama’s next African speech on democracy may be greeted with more skepticism on the continent than last year’s delivery in Accra. “If this is their representation of democracy and human rights, they shouldn’t talk about it anymore,” says Hailu Shawel, an Ethiopian opposition leader. “They should shut up.”
To a casual observer, the tens of thousands of people who poured into the central square of Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa on May 25 to peacefully celebrate the country’s elections might have been mistaken for a massive symbol of democratic progress in a poor and troubled part of the world. In fact it was quite the opposite.
The demonstrators were there to denounce Human Rights Watch for criticizing the victory of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front and its allies, who claimed 545 out of 547 seats in Parliament following a massive campaign of intimidation against opposition supporters. Many of the protesters were paid the equivalent of a day’s wage for a few hours of shouting against Human Rights Watch. They were emblematic not only of Ethiopia’s return to a one-party state, 19 years after the fall of a communist regime, but also of a growing trend away from democracy in wide swaths of Africa. The trend includes not only pariah states such as Eritrea and Sudan, but key Western allies and major recipients of foreign aid such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, which offers the world’s richest prize package to African leaders who both help their countries and peacefully leave office, decided not to offer an award each of the last two years
In Rwanda, President Paul Kagame has become a darling of the West for leading an economic renaissance in a nation traumatized by the 1990s genocide. But in upcoming August elections, Kagame looks set to duplicate his implausibly high 95 percent victory in the last vote and is pressing charges against an opposition leader for “divisionism,” namely downplaying the genocide. In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni, who denounced dictatorship in Africa when he took power in 1986 and was seen as another great democratic hope, has said he’ll try to extend his 24-year tenure in presidential elections next year. In Gabon and Togo, the deaths of long-serving autocrats Omar Bongo and Gnassingbé Eyadéma has meant elections in which power was smoothly transferred—to their sons. Disastrous polls in Nigeria and Kenya in 2007 were worse than those countries’ previous elections, and current trends show little hope for improvement. Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar, and Niger have all had coups since 2008, while Guinea-Bissau has been effectively taken over by drug cartels.
Africa’s own institutions have been unable to halt the trend, which has gained speed since a period of openness following the end of the Cold War. “The democratization process on the continent is not faring very well,” says Jean Ping, the Gabonese chairman of the African Union Commission, which has overseen a host of Pan-African agreements on democracy and human rights that many member states have either ignored or failed to ratify. “The measures that we take here are taken in a bid to make sure that we move forward. The crises, they are repeating themselves.” In country after country, the recipe for the new age of authoritarianism is the same: demonization and criminal prosecution of opposition leaders, dire warnings of ethnic conflict and chaos should the ruling party be toppled, stacking of electoral commissions, and the mammoth mobilization of security forces and government resources on behalf of the party in power. “The really powerful governments learned how to do elections,” says Richard Dowden, director of the London-based Royal African Society. That’s not to say the continent doesn’t retain some bright spots. In Ghana, presidents have twice stepped down to make way for leaders from the opposition. Democracy has flourished in Botswana and Benin, while regional giant South Africa continues to have a vibrant opposition and free press despite the African National Congress’s dominance of post-apartheid politics.
But backsliders have them outnumbered, a shift that hasn’t gone unnoticed in the West. Political freedoms declined in 10 countries on the continent in 2009, while they improved in just four, according to an annual report by Washington, D.C.–based Freedom House, which dropped three African countries from its list of “electoral democracies” last year. “Repression can take many forms, and too many nations, even those that have elections, are plagued by problems that condemn their people to poverty,” President Obama told Ghana’s Parliament last year. His top diplomat for Africa, Johnnie Carson, took office last year listing the continent’s democratization as his top priority.
Yet despite the rhetoric, the Obama administration and its European allies, which spent $27 billion on African development aid in 2009, according to the OECD, have largely acquiesced to the shift away from open politics on the continent. In some cases the rise of China means oil exporters such as Nigeria and Gabon have alternative markets for their production, thus reducing Western leverage to push for political reforms. In others, the refusal to challenge autocratic regimes has been driven by security—Ugandan, Burundian, and Ethiopian troops have functioned as de facto Western proxies in battling radical Somali Islamists in Mogadishu.
“The expectation was that this administration would give greater weight to issues of democracy and governance,” says Jennifer Cooke, an Africa analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. But this tepid response to Ethiopia’s ruling party’s 99.6 percent victory and the pre-cooking of the upcoming polls in Rwanda and Uganda show the boundaries of its willingness to push key allies.
Beyond security and the scramble for resources, a third factor in the West’s acceptance of Africa’s political retrenchment is the increasing influence of aid groups like the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.K.’s Department for International Development over their countries’ foreign policies. International pressure to get closer to the U.N. goal of giving 0.7 percent of their gross national income to development has led to steadily increasing aid budgets—even if there is evidence that aid is easily manipulated by authoritarian governments to suit their own ends.
“The aid departments are saying, ‘Don’t upset the politics of these countries because we’ve got all this aid to push out,’?” says Dowden of the Royal African Society. “But I would say these states need development work because the governance is so bad. You’ve got to put the politics first.”
Take Inderaw Mohammed Siraj, a 60-year-old Ethiopian opposition candidate who lost a finger after being beaten by ruling-party cadres in 2008. Last year, he says, he was kicked out of a food-aid program funded by the U.S., the World Bank, and the European Union when a local official from his village in a remote corner of northeast Ethiopia told him: “We will not feed opposition members.”
With virtually no opposition representation in Parliament, the independent press and local human-rights groups now closed or under attack, and the prospect of his children begging for food, he has realized life would be easier if he gave up politics. “I decided to stop being part of the opposition,” he says. “The party couldn’t help me. Foreigners didn’t do anything. Democracy isn’t working here.”
But cutting aid to authoritarian states like Ethiopia means not only halting some programs that help the poor but also losing influence in the region, a move that could haunt Western policymakers in future crises. “In Pakistan we cut the ties for the military in the 1990s,” says J. Peter Pham, a professor at James Madison University who was an Africa adviser to Sen. John McCain’s 2008 presidential campaign. “As a result, today the officers coming up to flag rank weren’t trained in U.S. institutions. We don’t have their mobile-phone numbers. Our diplomats rue not having that influence.”
Similarly with the U.S. and its European allies reluctant to send their own forces to halt African crises in Darfur, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, good relations with local strongmen like Museveni, Kagame, and Meles is a must. Today’s dictators may not be as cruel as Zaire’s Mobutu or other Cold War despots, nor Western aid so overt. But the strategy of backing nasty allies to influence events in a tough part of the world remains the same. That just means Obama’s next African speech on democracy may be greeted with more skepticism on the continent than last year’s delivery in Accra. “If this is their representation of democracy and human rights, they shouldn’t talk about it anymore,” says Hailu Shawel, an Ethiopian opposition leader. “They should shut up.”
Ethiopia expels U.S. journalist for probing civilian deaths
ADDIS ABABA (Bloomberg) By Jason McLure -
Ethiopia expelled an American journalist working for the U.S.-owned Voice of America radio service after detaining her for reporting claims by a rebel group that government forces killed 71 civilians.
Heather Murdock said today that she was detained by Ethiopian security June 12 while investigating reports by the separatist Ogaden National Liberation Front of killings last week near the eastern Ethiopian town of Babile, Murdock said in an e-mail today. She was released two days later and expelled from the country on June 17.
Bereket Simon, Ethiopia’s communication affairs minister, confirmed the expulsion, saying in a phone interview Murdock “was searching for ONLF people.”
Murdock said from Cairo she “didn’t know talking to people was a crime in Ethiopia.”
Ethiopia’s foreign ministry accused VOA of attempting to undermine the country’s May 23 elections and of “rooting for violence,” according to an e-mailed statement yesterday.
Ethiopia, where virtually all domestic radio broadcasters are controlled by the government or Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s ruling party, has jammed VOA broadcasts to Ethiopia since March. Last year, it jailed an Ethiopian reporter for VOA for two weeks on tax charges before releasing him.
Ethiopia expelled an American journalist working for the U.S.-owned Voice of America radio service after detaining her for reporting claims by a rebel group that government forces killed 71 civilians.
Heather Murdock said today that she was detained by Ethiopian security June 12 while investigating reports by the separatist Ogaden National Liberation Front of killings last week near the eastern Ethiopian town of Babile, Murdock said in an e-mail today. She was released two days later and expelled from the country on June 17.
Bereket Simon, Ethiopia’s communication affairs minister, confirmed the expulsion, saying in a phone interview Murdock “was searching for ONLF people.”
Murdock said from Cairo she “didn’t know talking to people was a crime in Ethiopia.”
Ethiopia’s foreign ministry accused VOA of attempting to undermine the country’s May 23 elections and of “rooting for violence,” according to an e-mailed statement yesterday.
Ethiopia, where virtually all domestic radio broadcasters are controlled by the government or Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s ruling party, has jammed VOA broadcasts to Ethiopia since March. Last year, it jailed an Ethiopian reporter for VOA for two weeks on tax charges before releasing him.
Saturday, June 19, 2010
Election rigging in Birtukan Mideksa's woreda
By Eskinder Nega
Perhaps the crudest claim by the EPRDF in its bungled-rigged-election saga this year is its “triumph” in Birtukan Mideksa’s wereda where she was born, raised and resided until she was imprisoned in 2009. Popularly known as Ferencay Legasion, the area was first settled by two prominent nobles of Haile Selasie’s era -- Ras Seyoum and Ras Kassa -- and the French embassy; which is said to sprawl on over eighty acres of land allotted to it by a jubilant Menelik who had just overwhelmed the Italians at Adwa in 1896.
Few people had ever heard of Birtukan Mideksa in 2000, the year of Ethiopia’s second illusory experiment with multi-party elections, when, after resigning from her position as a federal judge, as was then required by law, she sought public support in her bid for a seat in federal parliament as an independent candidate. “ I first heard her speak at a town-hall meeting a few months before the elections,” told me Nebeyou Bazezew, who was to later serve as her de-facto campaign manager. More than 1,300 residents had bizarrely turned out for usually sparingly attended town-hall meetings summoned thrice a year to review police conduct. “Police brutality and corruption had become unbearable. The people had lodged their complaint, and they had come out in large numbers to hear the results,” says Nebeyou.
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But the authorities had other ideas. Suspecting that police issues were being manipulated by the opposition, they showed up geared for a showdown. “The complaints about police brutality are unsubstantiated,” said one of them ominously. “Only known criminals have been beaten up.” Birtukan’s hand shot up. An anonymous and innocent face poised in-front of him, an official mockingly pointed towards her, beckoning her to speak. She stood up to speak; her words flowed out clearly and calmly, and people suddenly peered pryingly towards the young woman that was speaking. “I am fully acquainted with the law,” said Birtukan with censorious tone, surprising the officials amongst whom was not a single female. “And the law clearly stipulates that even suspected criminals are protected from physical harm while under custody. They should not be beaten up.” The applause was instantaneous and vociferous. The officials were furious. They glared at her for a few seconds, not sure what their next move should be. The very law they had prolifically used to silence the public was being used against them. And worse, by a young woman that had suddenly appeared out of nowhere. “Ah,” one of them finally shrieked. “What does she know about the law? The law we know has no qualms about how criminals should be handled. It teaches them a lesson in no uncertain terms,” he said dismissively, his head held up; staring smugly into her eyes. “ I don’t know what law she speaks of,” he winded down mischievously. She rose up from her seat, flushed and demanding to be heard. “I won’t let you speak,” told her the presiding official defiantly. He could see that the crowd was captivated by her, and he wanted to deny them a leader. “Then this is not a democratic forum. I have no reason to be here,” she countered irately; and walked out. To the utter amazement of the officials, almost everyone else rose up spontaneously and walked out with her. The officials sat frozen in their seats, humiliated and no doubt in serious trouble with their superiors. Thus was born Birtukan the politician: hero to thousands in her wereda long taken for granted by snooty local officials.
Almost overnight she was catapulted into a serious rival of established political parties. Freed from the daily routine of a 9 to 5 job, she became an assiduous campaigner. “Ours became the only campaign run almost exclusively by the youth,” recounts Nebeyou. “We were swamped by volunteers. They came to us. We did not go to them.” The campaign took off quickly, and her name recognition amongst voters rose phenomenally; but for the crucial break, her volunteers were soon to realize, money was indispensable. And this is where an anomalous supporter in the person of a half-brother of the Minister of Education, Genet Zewede, stepped into the scene with a cartload of promises. “He promised us almost everything under the sun,” says the source of Genene Asefa, who now fervently supports her imprisonment, and is the butt of jokes amongst returnees from the US (where he once lived) for his embellished -- and patently faked -- praise of Meles Zenawi. (Meles tolerates but also disdains sycophants, say those who know him.)
“Genene said -- and I quote -- 'these people (the EPRDF) are animals (awreh, in Amharic) and uncivilized (yalseletenu, in Amharic).’ He told us that there is hope only in young people organizing and fighting them,” says a source who was part of Birtukan’s campaign. But by then a threatened EPRDF felt that it was time to contain a growing threat. Key members of her young volunteers were summoned by officials and threatened with imprisonment. They left in droves, propped by the urging of Birtukan herself who told them that it was best to pull back. Few weeks short of the election, the grassroots network was suddenly undone, curbing the momentum that was building up. “She was not bitter,” says Nebeyou. Her experience only confirmed what she had long suspected: an EPRDF that is by disposition and calculated design authoritarian. But even then, she went on to secure more votes than could be reasonably expected in lieu of the limited budget and narrowed political space.
Five years later, Birtukan, who was tenaciously courted by political parties save the EPRDF, which she politely rebuffed, was not to contest again in the 2005 elections as many of her supporters had hoped and expected she would as CUD’s candidate. Instead, Mulualem Tarekegn, wife of a prominent opposition politician, Admasu Gebeyehu, and herself an emerging political personality, represented CUD and went on to win by a huge landslide.
Fast forward another five years to 2010, and Birtukan, by now affectionately dubbed the “indomitable lion” by friend and foe alike, had mustered the enthusiasm of not only her core supporters but even those who had not voted for her in 2000. For most residents of the wereda, one of the Addis’ many low income enclaves, the rise to national prominence of one of them resonated with their deepest aspiration: their pride in her achievement is palpable to outsiders. And as she sat in Kaliti Prison this year, victim of EPRDF’s malaise and conceit, few doubted the resolve of her wereda’s residents to send her a message by according her party, the eight parties’ coalition Medrek, a resounding victory in the election. The EPRDF, on the other hand, acutely cognizant of both the domestic and international implication of the election’s outcome in the wereda, was no less determined to prevent such an outcome. Defeat at the polls was perceived as no less than a personal affront to Meles Zenawi, panicking his cadres. Birtukan’s party was to be “defeated” at any cost. The alternative was not even contemplated.
Medrek fielded Baheta Tadesse, a popular high school teacher in a prestigious high school in Addis, for the seat that Birtukan would have run for if not for her incarceration. “Everyone knew that a vote for him meant a vote for her,” says a pundit who lives in the wereda. Few weeks before Election Day, wereda streets were inundated with posters dominated by her picture urging voters to cast their votes for Baheta. “You couldn’t miss it,” says the pundit. Baheta, it seemed, was set to win with his hands down.
For its part, the EPRDF relegated more resource, time and energy in Wereda 12 than anywhere else in the country. Every household was carefully scrutinized, each member profiled and for every five people a party member was assigned to garner their support. “A group of EPRDF members, usually led by a kebele official you know, will knock on your door and ask if you registered to vote,” says a resident. They will then ask to see the registration card, and without asking for permission, silently proceed to register its contents. “That had tremendous effect,” says the resident. People were terrified. “Many of those who live in Kebele houses felt that they could lose their house.” And few weeks before Election Day they returned with a form in hand. “In most cases, they refused to leave unless the form was filled and signed, committing the person to vote for the EPRDF,” told me the resident. Most people thought their signature was legally binding, potentially landing them in trouble if they voted otherwise. To cap it all, they were everywhere on Election Day, reminding residents of their promises as they went to polling stations. “We couldn’t avoid them on election day,” says the resident. A climate of fear had ingeniously been set up.
But this is only part of the story. Detailing what happened on Election Day requires a whole new article. I will save that for a future date.
______
The writer, prominent Ethiopian journalist Eskinder Nega, has been in and out of prison several times while he was editor of one of several newspapers shut down during the 2005 crackdown. After nearly five years of tug-of-war with the 'system,' Eskinder, his award-winning wife Serkalem Fassil, and other colleagues have yet to win government permission to return to their jobs in the publishing industry. Email: serk27@gmail.com
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